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Science plays an increasingly important role in public policy in a range of 
issues from national security to public health. Thus, scientists will play an 
increasingly important role in society. This dissertation first examines how federal 
science funding changes with partisan control of key political institutions. Next, 
science-related interests groups, including their formation, specialization, and 
lobbying activities, are examined. Interest groups are a growing aspect of the 
American political system. However, they are an understudied aspect of political 
institutions. While much of their activity occurs within the legislative branch, they 
also work in the executive and judicial branches to advocate their proposed 
position. 
I find that federal science funding increases with Democratic control over 
Congress as well as the presidency. This holds when examining overall, basic, 
and applied research as well as funding that funneled through specific federal 
agencies. I use this as a starting point to study science-related interest groups. I 
find that the population of science-related interest groups has grown over time 
and grown as federal science funding has increased. This population has 
become more specialized over time well, likely as a way for groups to attract 
additional members without having to compete with broad, well established 
groups that attract huge numbers of scientists. Finally, the lobbying activity of 
these groups is examined. I find that the lobbying activities of these science-
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related interest groups has increased over time and increased as federal science 
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Statement of Purpose 
 
 Science plays an increasingly important role in policy debates across a 
range of issue area, from national security to public health. As such, the political 
activities of scientists deserve study. This dissertation begins with an 
examination of the way that federal science funding has changed over time in 
relation to political party control of government institutions and follows with 
discussions of science-related interests groups and their activities. Because of 
the growing importance of science and technology in society, the activities of the 
groups they associate with become more and more important. This dissertation 




 Political science scholars have been studying interest groups and lobbying 
for decades and the literature is sizable (although the literature is much more 
limited than broad research areas such as congress, conflict, and political 
economy). Each individual chapter provides a literature review focused on the 
specific theories or concepts being tested to discussed. Thus, this introductory 
chapter will serve to provide highlights of the interest groups literature and some 
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of the lobbying literature in a broad sense to provide the reader context in which 
to place the following chapters and discussions.  
Interest groups: What are they and what do they do? 
An interest group is any group or organization that makes demands upon 
government. The more appropriate term, and one that is gaining traction and 
popularity in the literature, is “organized interests” because many of the groups 
making demands on the government are not what we traditionally identify as 
“interest groups.” This definition includes universities, trade associations, 
professional associations, and business firms. Interest groups engage in a wide 
variety of activities, such as direct lobbying, asking citizen members to contact 
their legislators, publishing research reports, and making presentations to 
Congress. The tactics that interest groups use depend on the group’s perception 
of how legislators may help them achieve their goals, their policy positions, and 
their resources (Hojnacki and Kimball 1999). Legislative branch lobbying is the 
most common form of interest articulation and the one we will focus on in this 
analysis, though scholars have discussed both executive and judicial lobbying 
activities. 
Interest group theory 
The earliest work on interest groups rested on pluralism and the 
assumption that because humans are social creatures, people would band 
together and create groups to protect their shared interests. These groups, so 
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goes the pluralist argument, then articulate their demands to the government, 
adding to political stability (Truman 1951). Early group theory rested on the 
pluralist assumption that the best political outcome would result from group 
conflict and compromise, with the government acting as mediator (Baumgartner 
and Leech 1998). However, interest group research quickly evolved as scholars 
recognized that the pluralist assumptions of equal representation was untrue, 
with the wealthy and well-connected having far greater group representation in 
Washington (Schattschneider 1960). 
Beyond pluralism 
Early critics of pluralist theory claimed that ordinary citizens are relatively 
powerless against the desires of elites (Mills 1956). E.E. Schattschneider 
famously remarked that “the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly 
chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent (1965, pg. 35).” Schattschneider 
also suggested that membership in the group system was biased by social class, 
as upwards of 90 percent of the population did not participate due to mobilization 
barriers (Schattschneider 1960). Schlozman’s (1984) empirical work supported 
this claim, noting that while only 16 percent of American adults are professionals 
or managers, they are represented by nearly 88 percent of Washington 
organizations.  
As interest group theory developed, questions of collective action began to 
replace questions of group power and influence as centers of scholarly attention, 
leading to economists weighing in on interest representation in America. Early 
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research in the pluralist tradition assumed that self-interest provides a powerful 
incentive to form groups, and that the political system provides an institutional 
setting for interaction (Mitchell and Munger 1991). Olson’s Logic of Collective 
Action, however, shows that forming and maintaining an interest group is not 
easy. The barriers to group organization identified by Olson help to explain the 
large bias toward business in the interest group universe (Olson 1965). In his 
later book, The Rise and Decline of Nations, Olson takes his argument further, 
arguing that some interests are better represented than others, and that these 
interests can retard economic growth and stifle political and economic 
development. Interest groups acting rationally in pursuit of their own interests can 
reduce the vitality of the system and restrict the menu of social choice of 
everyone else. In sum, Olson concluded that economic growth can be limited by 
a dense interest group system (Olson 1982). If groups are pursuing particularized 
benefits for their organizations or members of their organization, it follows that 
other organizations will have a smaller share of the budget. 
Virginia School theorists (also largely economists) sought to develop an 
“interest group theory of government”—that is, a general theory that examines 
how groups affect the behavior of politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens. They 
proceed from the assumption that modern markets operate alongside powerful 
political institutions that may distort and slow down efficient market processes. 
Rent seeking by groups—often in the form of seeking monopolistic rights granted 
by government—is rational and predictable. Market privileges granted to interest 
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groups represent a welfare loss to consumers and taxpayers (Mitchell and 
Munger 1991). Tollison and others maintain that the source of and motivation for 
rent seeking is the power of the government to tax everyone through general 
measures and spend on specific groups (Tollison and McCormick 1981). 
Needless to say, members of the Virginia School consider rent-seeking 
unproductive. 
Population ecology theories of interest groups 
The study of interest group populations has benefited greatly from 
population theories of biodiversity. In biology, the diversity of populations is 
shaped by the environment. Babies are important only in the sense that they 
provide members for the population. In the interest group analogy, new groups 
add to the overall population, but the characteristics of said population are 
shaped by the environment. New interest groups forming are only part of the 
story for the overall populations – the external environment shapes the 
population as well. Formation and mobilization of groups can only partially 
explain overall populations (Lowery and Gray 1995). This theory is discussed at 
length in Chapter II. 
Lobbying theory 
In the exchange theory of lobbying, interest groups are rational 
opportunists who aim to seek rents for their own gain.  Political science models 
assume here that legislators and lobbyists make mutually beneficial trades, 
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including campaign contributions and information (Morton and Cameron 1992). 
As lobbyists and legislators get to know one another, mutual confidence, trust, 
and understanding grow (Schlozman and Tierney 1986). We expect that 
lobbyists in our study are primarily giving members of congress information on 
how research funds would better their university and how this support would 
benefit their districts. This would also lead us to expect that the longer a 
university lobbies congress, the more relationships are cultivated and the more 
money we would expect to be allocated to that university. Lobbyists, in effect, are 
agents of exchange (Austen-Smith 1996).  
A second theory involves the idea of lobbying as persuasion rather than 
exchange.  Information exchange is at the heart of this theory. However, in 
contrast to earlier pluralist ideas, this information is viewed as not innocuous. 
Interest groups have a comparative advantage in gathering information that may 
be useful to legislators seeking to evaluate their reelection prospects. Lobbyists 
can use this information to persuade uncertain legislators that their reelection 
chances will be increased if they take a position that is friendly to the group 
(Hansen 1991). Lobbyists are thus able to persuade lobbyists to adjust their 
positions on the basis of the lobbying information (Wright 1996). 
A third theory involves lobbying as a type of legislative subsidy. Lobbyists 
can match policy information, political intelligence, and labor to strategically 
selected legislators. In this theory, lobbyists assist their allies by “arming” them 
with “weapons” designed to help them advocate and vote for legislation that is 
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advantageous to the lobbyist and their group (Hall and Deardorff 2006). This 
theory assumes the following: (1) a legislator must work at it if he/she expects to 
have any influence on policy; (2) legislators’ resources are scarce; (3) legislators 
have more than one policy concern at a time (though they care about some 
issues more than others); and (4) relative to legislators, lobbyists are specialists 
(Hall and Deardorff 2006). Thus, lobbyists are able to provide costly information, 
such as in-depth policy analyses and reports (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; 
Whiteman 1995), as well as political intelligence (Whiteman 1995; Wright 1996). 
Legislators structure the Congressional environment to channel relevant interest 
group influence and facilitate group access. Legislators affect their interactions 
with lobbyists by establishing lobbying enterprises, making known their 
information shortcomings. These lobbying enterprises allow lobbyists to 
coordinate their efforts with sympathetic legislators by coordinating legislators to 
advocate on behalf of their issue (Ainsworth 1997). 
Lobbying activities and congressional influence 
The “common” wisdom among journalists is that lobbying can have a 
substantial influence on how members of Congress vote (Birnbaum and Murray 
1987; Edsall 1988; Birnbaum 1992). Academics have been far more skeptical. 
The traditional scholarly wisdom is that lobbying groups have little success in 
persuading or pressuring members of Congress. Any influence they do exert 
comes from reinforcing the decisions and actions of legislators. Lobbyists may 
also have some success at persuading undecided or weakly committed members 
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to their position (Smith 1995). One of the reasons lobbying may not have large 
persuasion effects is that changing a person’s attitude, especially in the short 
run, is difficult. By and large, attempting to change a person’s attitude is a long 
term proposition, which is why much lobbying occurs with those who already 
agree with the lobbyist (Bauer et al. 1972). 
Not all scholars fully agree with Bauer, Pool, and Dexter that lobbying is 
ineffective. Smith suggests that while legislators’ preferences are stable in the 
short term, they are not necessarily attached to specific pieces of legislation. 
Thus, lobbyists are able to shape and influence a member’s perception of a piece 
of legislation that fits with the group’s perception and opinion (Smith 1993). 
Groups help legislators interpret policies and proposals. This influence is 
certainly substantial, even if it can change over time (Smith 1984, 1993). We 
hope that our study of lobbying activity and federal research funding can get at 
this debate for this, albeit limited, policy area.  
While much is unknown about the impact of lobbyists, scholars have made 
limited attempts to characterize instances where lobbyists do have a large 
amount of influence. Lobbyists will have more influence when legislators believe 
the expertise of the interest group exceeds their own (Rothenberg 1992). They 
will also have more influence when the group they represent is exclusive (Wright 
1990), although large coalitions have also shown to have disproportionate 
influence (Fowler and Shaiko 1987). Lobbyists can also have more influence on 
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issues are of low salience to the general public, which federal research funding 
certainly is (Rothenberg 1992).  
One of the first large scale studies of interest groups and policy was The 
Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making.  The authors question 
how influential groups actually are in Washington.  One of the key conclusions is 
that uncertainty is the key to understanding lobbyists.  There is growing 
uncertainty as to the path that government will take, from the expanded 
significance of federal policies to increased committee power and the expansion 
of staffs.  Groups now have multiple access points within Congress, but there is 
more competition for attention.  Thus, the increase of groups in Washington is a 
result of more groups trying to minimize their uncertainty and advocate their 
desired state.  However, groups do not know how much affect their work is 
having (Heinz et al. 1993).  The authors found that unlike previously prevalent 
iron triangle arguments, where an interest group, legislator, and agency actor 
form a subgovernment controlling an issue area (Hayden 2002), there is no 
cohesive private elite consistently occupies a central, mediating position in the 
networks among representatives (Heinz et al. 1993). 
By far the most influential book on lobbying of the 21st century has been 
Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why.  The authors 
explain why lobbyists are far less successful than popular rhetoric would suggest 
(Baumgartner et al. 2009).  However, massive opposition is also not something 
lobbyists are likely to encounter.  Of the 98 issue areas studied, 17 percent had 
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only one side on the issue and 60 percent of issue areas had only two sides.  
Overall, 60 percent of the issue areas had no change from the status quo, 13 
percent had modest change, and 27 percent of the cases experienced significant 
change.  The status quo is a powerful impetus for change.  Thus, once a 
university starts receiving appropriations, they are likely to continue to receive 
federal appropriations, making lobbyists’ continued efforts an exercise in 
maintaining the status quo.  
Dissertation approach 
The literature presented in this dissertation presents inconsistent results 
on interest group formation, growth, and change, as well as an inconsistent 
discussion of the effects of lobbying. Not only is the literature looking at the 
growth of interest group populations and how these populations change over 
time inconsistent, the results are especially sparse. Thus, this dissertation 
contributes to the population ecology of interest groups literature by looking at a 
very unique set of interest groups. While previous political science research has 
attempted to look at how the federal budget is formed, this is the first attempt to 
determine the relationship between partisan control of key political institutions 
and federal research and development funding. 
 Scientists and scientific research are not discussed in depth in the 
traditional political science literature. This is unfortunate because scientific 
research affects all aspects of life in America, from national security to energy to 
the environment. Thus, the political activities of scientists are important to study. I 
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spend the majority of the dissertation examining the growth of science-related 
interest groups, how these groups change with external influences (specifically 
the amount of federal research and development expenditures), and the lobbying 
efforts of these groups. This contributes to political science knowledge by adding 
to the literature on the “population ecology approach to interest groups” based on 
population biodiversity concepts. I believe this second idea, of incorporating 
science and scientists in to the traditional political science literature, is especially 
important given the growing importance of science and technology in modern 
society.  
 Much scientific research and development is currently funded by the 
federal government. Accordingly, I believe it is also important to examine the 
macro political influences of increasing and decreasing science funding. Simple 
questions have not yet been addressed in the literature, let alone answered. 
Does political control of Congress affect R&D outlays? Does the party of the 
president matter? Does political control of Congress and the presidency matter 
for federal R&D funding from neutral, liberal, and conservative federal agencies. I 
address these questions at a very high macro level in order to frame the 
subsequent discussions in this dissertation of interest group growth and change. 
 This dissertation is the first attempt to bring scientists and scientific 
research in to the realm of interest group and lobbying research. Research on 
scientific organizations could provide future insight when thinking about the 
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implementation of wide ranges of policies, from national security to energy, in the 








All of the chapters in this dissertation focus on federal research and 
development outlays or the ways that science-related interest groups have 
formed, changed, and act in relation to the political process. Chapter I examines 
how federal science funding has changed since the 1950s in relation to political 
control of the presidency, House, and Senate. I find that federal science funding 
increases with Democratic control of the House, Senate, and the presidency. 
This finding holds across seven agencies that all distribute science funding 
(Democratic control of Congress and the presidency increases federal R&D even 
from conservative federal agencies). Chapter II examines how the population of 
science-related interest groups has changed over time. I find that the number of 
groups increases over time and, more interestingly, increases as science funding 
increases. This supports the population ecology of interest groups literature, 
specifically, the energy, stability, area (ESA) theory developed by Gray and 
Lowery. This chapter is, specifically, models federal R&D funding as the “energy” 
aspect of this theory and provides a unique approach to this concept. Chapter III 
looks at how this interest group population changes over time. I find that as the 
number of groups increases, the population becomes more specialized. This 
specialization occurs with increased science funding as well. The results 
presented in this chapter also support the population ecology literature adapted 
to political science by Gray and Lowery. Chapter IV examines the lobbying 
activities of these groups since the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 required 
14 
 
filing of lobbying expenses. I find that science-related groups have increased 
their lobbying activity over time as well as with increased federal science funding. 
However, while many of the result presented in this chapter have coefficients in 
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Abstract  
Science and technology play an increasingly important role in policy 
debates, from energy independence to national security. Because of its growing 
importance, it is necessary to examine science and research funding and how it 
changes over time. For years, it was assumed by the general public and elites 
that scientists are liberal Democrats, a perception that bears out in surveys of 
scientists. I evaluate this axiom by examining the federal science budget and 
how it has changed with party control of Congress and the party of the 
presidential administration. Examining the federal budget for science from 1951 
until 2012, I find that federal funding increases when Democrats control 
Congress and the presidency, holding even when the funding more closely aligns 
with traditional Republican preferences, such as Department of Defense 
research. The relationship is less clear when expanded cross-nationally, with 





Scientists, as a professional group, have long been perceived as a group 
of liberal Democrats. For example, their perceived support for policies such as 
combatting climate change closely mirrors the preferences of the Democratic 
Party. Moreover, for the last three elections, a high profile group of scientists – all 
of whom are Nobel Prize winners from physics, chemistry, and medicine – has 
issued letters supporting the Democratic presidential candidate. In 2012, 68 
scientists signed the letter, claiming that Mitt Romney could “devastate a long 
tradition of support for public research and investment in science,” while 
President Obama would continue “America’s proud legacy of discovery and 
innovation,” ensuring progress on health, the economy, and the environment 
(Sarewitz 2013).  
The idea that scientists lean Democratic and liberal is supported by 
surveys of the voting and ideological preferences of scientists.  In a 2009 Pew 
Center survey, only 6 percent of scientists self-identified as Republicans, 
whereas 55 percent self-identified as Democrats and 32 percent self-identified as 
independents. Ideologically, scientists are far more likely than the general public 
to self-identify as liberal (52 verses 20 percent) or very liberal (14 verses 5 
percent) (Kohut et al. 2009). As many scientists are reliant on government 
funding for their employment and/or to support their research, their support for 
Democrats, who typically advocate a larger role for government, is rational. Thus, 
we ask the question – is this support for Democrats actually rational given many 
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scientists’ reliance on federal science funding? Given shared control over the 
federal budget, does federal science funding increase when Democrats control 
the presidency, House, or the Senate?  
The United States has long been a world leader in research and 
development (R&D). The U.S. produces more research articles than any other 
country worldwide and has more top universities than any other country (World 
Bank 2013; THE 2013). With recent sequestration and continuing budget 
debates in an increasingly partisan federal government, the question of how 
federal science funding changes with partisan control of institutions is an 
important question – especially as the world faces increasingly technical 
challenges, from clean energy to national security. Science could offer important 
answers to these challenges, but progress is contingent upon funding. Some 
have claimed there is often a tension between the government and science 
regarding both politics and policy management (Lambright 2008; Bromley 2002), 
which is why understanding how science funding changing with partisan control 
of government is so important. 
 Data on federal science funding distributed to researchers at national labs, 
universities, and non-profits was compiled by the National Science Foundation 
(NSF). This data was reported as overall federal support for research and 
development (R&D), as well as parsed out as either basic or applied R&D 
funding. I use this data to examine whether science funding increases or 
decreases with Democratic control of the presidency, House, and Senate. The 
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data from the NSF is also divided in to overall, basic, and applied research as 
distributed by a variety of government agencies. Thus, I can examine if the 
amount of research money allotted to and then distributed by agencies changes 
with partisan control of the presidency, House, and Senate. This is interesting 
given that federal agencies range from conservative to liberal in their policies and 
workings. 
 There is also no reason for this phenomenon to be confined to the United 
States. Political parties can be classified on a left-right continuum based on rtheir 
policies. I am especially interested in liberal (such as Social Democratic or other 
leftist parties) and conservative (such as Christian Democratic or other right 
parties) parties. Focusing on the OECD countries and using data from the World 
Bank of the percent of each nation’s budget committed to research and 
development, I test the trends in the OECD countries. This data only considers 
the percent of the budget committed to overall R&D and is not parsed out in 
greater detail. However, it does allow us to see if the trends observed in the 
United States in regard to science funding and party are generalizable to the 
other OECD countries. 
Party influence and the budget 
Presidents have great power as unitary actors. This is especially true in 
terms of the budget. Presidents are given the opportunity to submit a first draft of 
the budget to Congress. Congress, of course, can change the details, but it rarely 
makes large scale changes to the president’s budget. Much of the power of the 
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president in this regard derives from his status as a unitary actor. While the 
president rarely gets the last word on a policy issue such as the budget, he often 
gets to make the first move, shaping the landscape over which subsequent 
options range (Rudalevige 2010). Formulating his preferred budget is one way 
that the president can set forth an agenda and “big picture management” of his 
administration’s policies (Seidenfeld 1994). The president is the only elected 
official with a national constituency, and is thus in a unique position to influence 
policy, especially as it is carried out in the bureaucracy (Gleiber and Shull 1992; 
Hammond and Knott 1996). 
I hypothesize that Democratic presidents are more likely than Republican 
presidents to support research with “benevolent” purposes, especially basic 
research, which offers less immediate applicable or profitable applications. While 
we know that the president wields influence over the budgetary process, we also 
know that Congress is very active in this process as well. Moreover, some 
scholars claim that congressional parties have gotten stronger over the previous 
decades as party voting has increased, the whip system has expanded, and 
rules regarding legislation have become more complex (Cox and McCubbins 
1993). Parties have also become more polarized, leading to the idea that party 
could influence the budget in greater and greater ways (Lebo et al. 2007; Lowry 
and Shipan 2002; McCarty et al. 2006; Sinclair 2006; Roberts and Smith 2003).  
Party is very influential in determining legislative voting behavior. But what 
exactly do we mean by “party influence” in this context? Legislators face 
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pressure from party leaders in the form of rewards and punishments tied to their 
votes (Snyder and Groseclose 2000). The member’s vote is compared to the 
party position – a center of gravity that reflects a party’s overall stance on a given 
issue (Krehbiel 2000). Rewards include favorable committee assignments, 
leadership positions, campaign funds, federal projects to the member’s district, 
and expedited treatment for favored bills. Punishments may include dismissal 
from committees, roadblocks for bills, and decreasing federal funds for the district 
(Snyder and Groseclose 2000). Keeping members in line is important for parties 
because party labels serve as “brand names” and information shortcuts for 
voters. By keeping a consistent voting record on most issues, voters have more 
concrete ideas about what the parties represent (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 
Romer and Snyder 1994). There are also electoral consequences for legislators 
to cooperate as a party – parties wish to maximize legislative victories while 
minimizing electoral consequences of overpartisanship (Lebo et al. 2007).  
There has also been scholarly work on the question of when parties 
matter. Political party affiliation is one of the best predictors of legislative voting 
behavior (Snyder and Groseclose 2000). According to Snyder and Groseclose, 
party influence appears most frequently on votes involving budgets, Social 
Security, social welfare policy, and the debt limit (2000). Federal spending is, 
perhaps, the most important indicator of policy preferences because it indicates 
to the electorate what groups they favor and represent (Kiewiet and McCubbins 
1991). These types of votes set spending priorities, which supports the idea that 
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political party influence is important for federal outlays related to scientific 
research. Even scholars supporting a weak view of parties have noted that 
parties in the United States play an important, though not unlimited, role in 
federal outlays (Levitt and Snyder 1995).  
In what follows, I offer basic three hypotheses to start the discussion: 
Hypothesis 1: Democratic control of the presidency, House, and Senate lead to 
increased overall federal science funding. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Democratic control of the presidency, House, and Senate lead to 
increased basic federal science funding. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Democratic control of the presidency, House, and Senate lead to 
increased applied federal science funding. 
 
 In addition to setting aside part of the overall budget for scientific research, 
money must be allotted to individual agencies for distribution to scientists 
nationwide. Data from the NSF also breaks down research funding by agency in 
all three categories – overall funding, basic research funding, and applied 
research funding. I examine a variety of these agencies to determine if a more 
nuanced approach would be appropriate for a relationship between political party 
control and science funding. I look at overall, basic, and applied research funding 
for a variety of agencies. Specifically I examine (1) The Department of 
Agriculture, which typifies a politically neutral department; (2) The Department of 
Commerce and The Department of Defense, which are conservative; and (3) The 
Department of Energy, The Department of Education, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, and The National Science Foundation, all of which skew 
liberal (Clinton and Lewis 2008). Clinton and Lewis measure each of these 
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agencies’ preferences based upon an expert survey and categorize them on the 
political spectrum. I have used the same scale in this study. 
Hypothesis 4: Neutral agency funding will see small, if any, changes in science 
funding levels with Democratic administration. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Conservative agencies will see lower levels of overall, basic, and 
applied research funding under Democratic control of Congress and the 
presidency than they will under Republican control of Congress and the 
presidency. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Liberal agencies will see higher levels of overall, basic, and 
applied research funding under Democratic control of Congress and the 
presidency than they will under Republican control of Congress and the 
presidency. 
 
 Party control also matters outside the U.S. (Schmidt 1996). Schmidt, in 
fact, suggests that party composition of government should be featured more 
prominently in research (1996). This leads to my interest in party composition 
and science funding in a comparative context. While reliable data here is more 
limited (the World Bank provides data on scientific R&D funding as a percent of 
the overall budget), it should be of interest as a start to examining the role of 
science funding in a broader context. 
 According to the hypothesis of partisan influence, a major determinant of 
variations in policy choices across nations is the party composition of 
government (Hibbs Jr 1992). This has been shown especially often in empirical 
research on economic and social policy (Cameron 1978; Castles 1982; Alesina 
and Rosenthal 1995). Partisan theory rests on the assumption that politics serves 
as a marketplace of policies and ideas and the outcomes (i.e., policies) are 
based on institutional differences between countries. Differences between parties 
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matter for policy, which is why I include a comparative element in this work. 
Leftist parties, for example, are more likely to spend more money on social 
policy, equality, and employment (Tufte 1980). Thus, for science funding, I 
expect to see similar relationships as we saw in the United States. 
Hypothesis 7: As the percent of leftist control of government increases, the 
percentage of the budget devoted to research will increase. 
Data and methods 
Data on research and development funding comes from the National 
Science Foundation’s 2012 Science and Engineering Indicators (NSF 2012). The 
National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (a division of the National 
Science Foundation) maintains a database of current and historic federal funds 
for science and technology research.  
Dependent variables 
The overall federal funding data is provided from 1951-2012 in millions of 
dollars, as well as percent of the overall budget. For basic research, funding data 
is provided from 1952 onward and for applied data, 1956 onward. All of the 
funding data are in constant 2012 U.S. dollars according to the consumer price 
index (CPI) provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and is the valued used in 
these analyses.  
Relying on the data from the NSF, I construct the following dependent 
variables: Total R&D funding, Basic R&D funding, and Applied R&D funding. 
Each of these dependent variables is a funding number corrected to constant 
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2012 U.S. dollars using Consumer Price Index data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Total R&D funding provides a value from 1951 to 2012. During this 
time period, the lowest value of funding observed was $13,435,902,693 and the 
highest value observed was $150,992,598,571. Values for basic R&D funding 
are included from 1952 to 2012 with a range of $990,352,438 to 
$35,180,274,854. Applied R&D funding is given from 1956 to 2012 and ranges 
from $5,410,566,448 to $33,622,282,819. 
The dataset also contains information on the amount of federal research 
funding allotted to specific agencies annually for overall, basic, and applied 
research funding. For this study, I examine the overall, basic, and applied 
research funding for the following agencies: Department of Agriculture, 
Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of Education, 
Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, and National Science 
Foundation. These agencies were chosen because they all provide substantial 
R&D funding for both basic and applied research. These agencies were among 
those ranked by Clinton and Lewis and placed on the liberal-neutral-conservative 
ideological scale.  
The data from the National Science Foundation allowed me to construct 
the following dependent variables relating to R&D funding from various agencies: 
Overall Agriculture R&D funding, Overall Commerce R&D funding, Overall 
Defense R&D funding, Overall Education R&D funding, Overall Energy R&D 
funding, Overall EPA R&D funding, Overall NSF R&D funding, Basic Agriculture 
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R&D funding, Basic Commerce R&D funding, Basic Defense R&D funding, Basic 
Education R&D funding, Basic Energy R&D funding, Basic EPA R&D funding, 
Basic NSF R&D funding, Applied Agriculture R&D funding, Applied Commerce 
R&D funding, Applied Defense R&D funding, Applied Education R&D funding, 
Applied Energy R&D funding, Applied EPA R&D funding, and Applied NSF R&D 
funding. These were used in a variety of tests to determine if partisan control of 
political institutions affected the amount of R&D funds available to various 
agencies.  
Cross-national data on research and development funding as a percent of 
GDP was gathered from the World Bank (World Bank 2013). This allowed me to 
create the comparative political party dependent variable: Percent R&D of GDP. 
On this variable, I was able to collect data from all of the OECD countries from 
1996 to 2010. These percentages ranged from 0.4562 percent in Greece in 1996 
to a high of 4.13 percent in Sweden in 2001. The average value for this time 
period was 1.98 percent with a standard deviation of 0.8 percent. The countries 
included in this analysis were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Independent variables 
The independent variables of interest are Party of the President, Party 
controlling the House, and Party controlling the Senate. Each is a dichotomous 
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variable, with “1” indicating Democratic Party control, and “0” indicating 
Republican control.  
I also believed it was important to account for outside factors and I chose 
to focus on two specific events in recent U.S. history. I first included a control 
variable for whether or not the United States was involved in the Cold War. There 
was increased spending on research during Cold War in an attempt to overpower 
and out-militarize the Soviet Union (Bartels 1994). The Cold War defined 
American science. During the decade after World War II, the Department of 
Defense was the single largest patron of American science. While their share of 
R&D decreased steadily over the next two decades, this was reflected in the 
growth of the National Science, Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, and the National Institutes of Health (Leslie 1993). Thus, each 
year until 1990 was given a value of “1” on the variable Cold War, and a “0” 
otherwise.  
It is also likely that recessions lead to less science funding, regardless of 
political party power. While much of the work in this area focuses on private R&D 
during recessions (Brockhoff 1998), it has been suggested that the government 
also will decrease R&D funding during recessions (Noll 2003). Thus, I create a  
second dichotomous control variable called Recession, which is assigned a value 
of “1” during recession years identified by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER 2013). Because my forthcoming analysis is a time series 
analysis, I take in to account that the occurrence of a recession may lag behind 
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actual allocation of R&D funding. During the statistical analysis, I consider up to a 
three year lag. However, all of the lags did not show significance and we close to 
zero. Thus, in the later analyses, I only present the results for whether or not the 
U.S. was in a recession the year in question. 
Data on parties in parliament cross-nationally was gathered from the 
Comparative Manifestos Project, which classified each party as one of the 
following: ecological, communist, social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic, 
conservative, nationalist, agrarian, ethnic and regional, or special issue (Volkens 
et al. 2011). While percent of party vote was available, I opted to use percent that 
each party represented in parliament because, while popular support for parties 
is important, public opinion is unlikely to greatly sway R&D funding decisions. 
Thus, the percent of parliament controlled by social democratic parties is 
determined to be the most appropriate variable. The left-right measure of party 
composition in government that I am including in this study is the one most often 
cited in the literature and will also be used in this study (Schmidt 1996). I focus 
on the OECD countries because they have the highest levels of support for 
research and development (the countries included are listed in the dependent 
variables section). They are also the most likely to have fair and free elections 
with transparent budget processes. Thus, I created the following independent 
variables: Percent Social Democrats in Parliament, Percent Conservatives in 





The data was constructed as time series. For each year, a dependent 
variable reflecting the R&D funding value in question is paired with the 
independent variables of interest as well as several control variables. This 
created a time series dataset. As such, all data analyses were performed in Stata 
using time series analysis. Several analyses suggested the data contained a 
great deal of serial correlation (as expected by the nature of the data). The 
Breush-Godfrey test, which tests for the presence of serial dependence and for 
autocorrelation in the errors of a regression model, was insignificant. The Durbin-
Watson test, which is less general, tests for the presence of autocorrelation in the 
residuals and was significant, indicates relatively high levels of autocorrelation. 
This is intuitive – federal funding values do change annually, but administration 
are likely to use the previous year’s budget as a starting point for the next 
budget. As such, the primary analysis tool is the Cochrane-Orcutt regression, a 
generalized least-squared method used in linear regression models where the 
errors are first-order serially correlated. This helps adjust a linear model to 
address the serial correlation. 
Results and discussion 
The results presented in this section follow our broadly defined 
hypotheses. In short, it appears that Democratic control of political institutions 
results in increased federal funding for scientific research and development. 
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Overall trends in federal research funding in the USA 
We start by examining the overall trends present in research funding in the 
USA. Table 1 describes science funding, parsed out simply as overall funding, 
basic research funding, and applied research funding, in relation to political party 
control.  
When examining overall research funding, the only significant variable is 
Cold War. This largely fits with what we know– that during the Cold War the 
United States continually sought to make the military (and especially the nuclear 
program) stronger, faster, sleeker, and more efficient. This required a large input 
of research funding. For both basic and applied research funding, variables 
signifying Democratic control of the presidency and the Senate are significant 
and positive. That is, Democratic control of these institutions is associated with 
more funding. Thus, the narrative in the media and popular culture of scientists 
as liberal Democrats seems to be rational. The data suggests that one reason 
scientists vote Democratic is because, amongst other things, funding that 
supports their livelihood largely increases during Democratic control of 
institutions, even after accounting for economic conditions. Examining both basic 
and applied research separately will allow me to analyze different research 
objectives. Basic research often supports more fundamental scientific research 
that rarely has immediate (or long-term) market potential. The idea that 
Democrats support science for the sake of knowledge is one that aligns well with 
the common perceptions of a Democratic party supportive of education and
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Table 1. Three dependent variables (overall research funding, basic research funding, and applied research funding) 






knowledge. The similar result in support of applied research is interesting in that 
applied research often has more market potential (though still, likely, not 
immediate). This suggests the importance Democrats may place on science 
funding when developing the budget and supports Hypothesis 1.  
Overall federal science funding by agency in the USA 
 In this section, I examine the research and development budgets of seven 
agencies. These agencies were chosen because they distribute science funding 
(although to varying amounts) and, broadly, trend on the political spectrum. 
Agriculture is my “neutral” agency, Commerce and Defense trend conservative, 
and Education, Energy, EPA, and NSF trend liberal. In Table 2, the dependent 
variable is the overall (basic, applied, and development) funding that each 
agency distributes. The model contains the same independent variables I used in 
the first model.  
Here, we find there are fewer statistically significant estimates. But the 
significant results that do exist support the idea that Democratic control is 
associated with higher levels of science funding, regardless of the nature of the 
agency in question. The designated neutral agency gets more funding under 
Democratic control of the Senate, but not much more--only a 2.6 percent 
increase above the constant. Interestingly, the conservative Defense Department 
also saw an increase when Democrats controlled the House, although this is a 
higher percentage increase above the constant at 4.3 percent. The largest 
increase in Defense science funding comes during the Cold War period.
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This fits in with the results presented in Table 1, where overall research 
funding increased during this time period, mostly through Defense Department 
research. Lastly, the more liberal NSF saw an increase in funding under 
Democratic control of the presidency (4.3 percent above the constant), and 
Democratic control of the Senate (4.5 percent). It is interesting to note that 
conservative and liberal agencies saw larger increases than the more neutral 
Agriculture Department. 
These results support Hypothesis 4 in that the neutral agency (Agriculture) 
saw small changes based on party control of various political institutions. It is not 
supportive of Hypothesis 5, as conservative agencies still saw increases in 
science funding under Democratic administrations. And it is supportive of 
Hypothesis 6, as liberal agencies saw increases under Democratic Party control. 
Earlier, I showed that both basic and applied research increased under 
Democratic Party control. Next, I test to see if this relationship still holds when 
funding is parsed out by agency. 
Basic research funding by agency 
 Basic research funding, attempting to address more fundamental 
questions of science, is distributed by a variety of agencies. Table 3 shows the 
results of my analysis of basic research funding for different agencies. 
Many of the findings confirm and support my previous findings. Despite the 
conservative or liberal leanings of an agency, funding levels tend to increase with 
Democratic control. This is statistically significant for Commerce when 
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Democrats control the House, Defense when Democrats control the Senate, 
Energy when Democrats control the Senate and the presidency, and for the NSF 
when Democrats control the presidency. We see here that the Cold War has a 
statistically significant effect for both Education funding as well as the EPA. It is 
most interesting that funding for the EPA decreases during the Cold War. This is 
not entirely surprising, as Cold War research focused on nuclear issues rather 
than environmental concerns. 
Once again, we find some support for Hypothesis 4 (the neutral committee 
shows small, statistically insignificant increases), no support for Hypothesis 5 
(conservative agencies saw increases under Democratic Party control), and 
support for Hypothesis 6 (liberal agencies saw increases under Democratic Party 
control). The next section repeats this analysis again, but examines applied 
research funding levels. 
Applied research funding by agency 
In this section, we repeat the above analysis on the applied research 
funding data. If anything, I expect this to be the category of funding data least 
likely to increase under Democratic Party control.  
Table 4 is unique in that it displays several negative coefficients. 
Interestingly, however, the political estimates are seldom significant. In other 
words, even when as funding decreases during times of recession or the Cold 
War, applied science funding is higher under Democratic Party control than 
under Republican Party control. The only statistically significant estimate we see 
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is on Presidential party in the EPA model. Overall, Table 4 provides little support 
for Hypotheses 4, 5, or 6.  
Comparative science funding and leftist control of government 
 This final section examines science funding in a comparative context. The 
data from the World Bank is much cruder than the extensive, detailed data 
collected from the National Science Foundation. However, I was able to put the 
results presented above from the United States in some kind of perspective by 
comparing them to science funding in a cross-national context. Here, I focus on 
the percent of GDP that OECD countries devote to scientific research (the 
variable most related to the previous dependent variables of interest) by year. I  
limited my analysis to OECD countries because they are most likely to have free 
and fair elections that reflect the population and, largely, have party competition. 
Table 5 shows that as leftist presence in government increases, there is a 
decrease in the percent of the budget devoted to scientific R&D. However, this 
decrease is very, very small. When one adds a variable for the number of 
scientific researchers in a population, the statistical significance of party control 
disappears (although the coefficient is still in the same direction). One of the 
problems here may be the time aspect. Here, my analysis only covers from 1996-
2010, while data from the United States covers 1951-2012. However, overall 
these results suggest that in a cross-national context political control has little or 
no effect on budgets. Perhaps this is a result of vastly different budgeting 
systems across countries, especially as compared to the United States.
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Commentary on the results 
 A cursory observation of the results presented in this chapter would reveal 
a lack of consistency across models and across analyses. In some models, 
Democratic control of an institution is statistically significant while it is not in 
others. In some models, control of the House is statistically significant while 
Senate and the presidency are not. Some models show statistical significance for 
the Cold War and not others. Or there could be some combinations of variables 
that are statistically significant.  
 Even though results aren’t strictly statistically significant across all models, 
there is enough consistency to draw general conclusions. Largely, Democratic 
control leads to increased federal R&D funding. Even when the coefficients aren’t 
statistically significant, they typically are in right direction to support our theory 
and hypotheses.  
 It is also important to note that the largest R2 value we see across the 
models is 0.27. The R2 value is a measure of how well the regression fits the 
actual data. That is, how much of the variation in the data is actually explained by 
our model.  This means that in the model with the 0.27 R2 model, 27 percent of 
the variance in the data is explained by the variables in our model. While this 
may seem like a low value, it has been suggested that the eternal quest for the 
largest R2 possible in political science is actually a misleading venture. The 
authors suggest that it should rather be used to compare coefficients from 
models using the same data and methods. Thus, it can be used to determine the 
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most ideal set of variables that creates a model that most thoroughly supports 
your theory (King 1986). 
 A large reason that the R2 is relatively low in disciplines like political 
science as compared to chemistry or physics is the presence of a political 
opportunity structure. The concept was originally introduced by Tarrow and has 
four aspects to the concept: 1) the openness or closure of political access; 2) the 
degree of stability or instability of political alliances; 3) the availability of strategic 
partnerships; and 4) political conflicts within and among elites. This concept 
addresses the configuration of power within the political structure (Tarrow 1983). 
Scholars have attempted to address and account for the political opportunity 
structure. These studies and models that address this issue typically make the 
model more complex and intricate by addressing State institutions and other 
formal institutional structures (Kriesi 1995). The political opportunity structure has 
also been addressed by comparative cross-national studies of similar policies 
across a variety of political structures (Kitschelt 1986). However, this study 
attempts to provide a clear, concise, and simple model of the relationship 
between federal R&D funding and Democratic control of political institutions. 
However, I believe that the fact that the models presented in this paper account 
for up to 27 percent of the variance in the data, without taking in to account the 
complex political structures present that could be represented by dozens, or even 
hundreds, of variables is, in this case, superior to the potentially complex 
formulation. I presented a simple model that provides information that addresses 
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when we see increases in federal R&D funding as it relates to partisan control of 
political institutions. 
Scientists as an organized interest 
 The term “interest group” is often tinged with negative connotations and 
can invoke images of lobbyists taking legislators on lavish vacations or engaging 
in bribery. Many scholars are now moving to the term “organized interest” as a 
way to discuss these groups without these negative impressions (Baumgartner 
and Leech 1998). There is an image in the media and in society that paints 
scientists as liberal Democrats. Part of this likely comes from the association of 
scientists with institutes of higher education. Moreover, most scientists have 
advanced degrees, and universities have a reputation as bastions of liberalism in 
American. Scientists support policies designed to combat global warming, which 
is a liberal policy stance. They also work in areas including sustainability and 
environmental chemistry, which also trend liberal. But interest groups do not work 
as a one way street. If scientists lend support for Democratic policy stances and 
preferences, they should receive something in return. 
 And I do indeed find that scientists get something in return for their 
liberalness. When Democrats control key political institutions that affect the 
budget, outlays for scientific research increase. And they increase across time 
and across a variety of agencies. This occurs, largely, without formal, large scale 
lobbying efforts. Formal lobbying by science-related interest groups and is a topic 
that will be covered in depth in future work. 
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This paper suggests that future research could probe the relationship 
between increases in federal R&D funding under Democratic administrations and 
the overwhelming support among scientists for the Democratic Party. Do 
scientists vote Democratic because they support research? Do Democrats 
increase funding because scientists support them? Or is this a natural alignment 
of interests across the spectrum? Scientists, overall, are liberal, and science 
funding, which benefits all scientists, increases when Democrats control political 
institutions. This is not to say that formal interest groups, such as trade and 
professional associations, do not engage in formal lobbying. The author of this 
paper participated in several fly-in congressional lobbying days on behalf of the 
American Chemical Society. There, we talked with members of Congress and 
their staff about the importance of new appropriations for science funding and 
how it contributes to the vitality of the nation.  
Conclusion 
The federal government has a long history of involvement in science and 
scientific research. While American scientists began to form alliances with the 
federal government prior to World War II, it was during the war that the 
relationship grew most rapidly. The war showed the federal government how 
valuable science is in innovation. Science and engineering research, basic and 
applied, has been funded substantially by the federal government since then 
(Lane 2008).  
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Scientists have often been characterized as a liberal leaning group that 
supports Democrats and Democratic initiatives, leading them to be characterized 
as a Democratic organized interest or interest group. Surveys have shown that 
scientists overwhelming self-identify as liberal and vote Democratic. I have 
shown in this paper that scientific research and development increases when 
Democrats control the key political institutions of the House, Senate, and 
presidency. This support given to scientists as a whole supports the idea of 
considering scientists as an interest group. 
The likely mechanism here is that Democrats are more likely to draft 
budgets will larger support for areas that play a major role or are supported by 
their party platform. Scientific research, especially basic research, is likely to be 
viewed as a public good for society and, thus, something to be supported by the 
federal government. Because scientists largely support Democrats and identify 
as liberal, Democratic lawmakers do not feel any conflict when suggesting 
budgets with large scientific research components.While some science-related 
interest groups do engage in formal lobbying, I do not think it will be a huge 
contributor to the increase in research funding we see under Democratic 
administrations. However, the role of science interest groups, including their 
formation and lobbying efforts, will be described in detail in future work.  
One area of future work is to continue exploring science funding in a 
comparative aspect. What characteristics of different countries make them more 
or less likely to support science funding? This could be parsed out as basic and 
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applied research. It would also be interesting to study international collaboration. 
The United States spends more money on research than any other country, but 
many countries are collaborating and sharing resources, especially on large 
undertakings. The Large Hadron Collider at CERN (European Organization for 
Nuclear Research) is supported by 21 member states (CERN 2013). Science will 
continue to get “bigger” with costs of experiments, especially those that address 
the fundamental nature of our universe, rising steeply in cost. In a time of budget 
cuts and talks of austerity, international collaborations will become vital to the 
continuation of science, especially at the fundamental level.  
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Abstract  
Since the government began funding research and development in the 
United States, science-related interest groups, specifically trade or professional 
associations focused on chemicals, biology, botany, chemistry, computer 
science, energy, geology, physics, or general science, have formed for a variety 
of reasons. In this paper, we explore how the growth of science-related interest 
groups is related to the increase in federal funding for science and how our 
findings conform to popular theories of interest group formation.  
Specifically, we test Gray and Lowery’s ESA theory to see if there is 
something inherently unique about science-related groups as compared to more 
traditional types of organized interests. Primarily, the concepts of population 
ecology will be used to examine the relationship between federal science funding 
and science group formation. The concepts are supported empirically for 
science-related interest groups. The population of science-related interest groups 
follows the same general trend that has been found for a variety of other 
populations over time, starting with lower overall numbers of groups and growing 
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over time. More interestingly, however, is the result that group formation also 
responds to changes in federal science funding. Specifically, we find that as 
federal research and development funding increases, so does group density. 
Statistical results indicate that each additional $5.8 billion in research and 
development funding leads to the creation of one new science-related interest 
group. As federal funding increases, more groups will form to organize members 
and advocate for issues such as additional funding. This external stimulus 
provides motivation for group founders to organize.  
Published Work 
While priorities in the federal budget have changed over the decades, the 
scope of federal research funding has largely remained unchanged since the 
1970s, as illustrated in Figure 1 (Drake 2002). In short, the government has 
steadily increased the amount of money it contributes to research and 
development since the late 1960s. Scholars have suggested that interest group 
populations are shaped by the environment in which they exist, suggesting that 
interest groups are simply responding to the system they are in rather than 
attempting to shape it. Are they right? This is the question we address here by 
examining science-related interest groups—trade or professional associations 
focused on chemicals, biology, botany, chemistry, computer science, energy, 
geology, physics, or general science. Previous work has shown that interest 
groups can be influential across a wide range of policy issues when looking at 
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federal discretionary funding (Lowry and Potoski 2004), so the growth of science-
related interest groups and federal R&D is ripe for inquiry. 
Government-funded science 
Since the Manhattan Project, the government has steadily increased the 
amount of science research it funds, especially basic research. In fact, federal 
funds pay for approximately one-third of all research and development (R&D) in 
the United States. Roughly half of this research is related to defense or health 
(Blasgen 2002). In all, the U.S. spends more money on “R&D” than any other 
nation on earth. As a result, four of the five top science journals in the world are 
produced in the U.S., and as of 1997, 95 percent of journal articles cited by other 
articles were published in English (up from 83 percent in 1977) (Maratos-Flier 
2002). Figure 1 illustrates the increase in federal research funds between 1958 
and 2009 (in constant 2009 dollars), as well as the percentage of the overall 
federal budget dedicated to research. Federal research funding has helped lead 
to American research dominance. 
The government levels of research funding are at an all-time high level, 
which is occurring as more and more policy decisions involve science and 
scientific research. These policy issues range from national security to public 
health. Individual scientists may not realize that work is so necessary and 
relevant, but organizations have noted this importance for years. More and more 




Figure 1. Overall U.S. funding for research and development and federal R&D funding as a percent of the overall 




full-time, in-house lobbyists. Indeed, the American Physical Society (the 
professional association for physicists in the United States) offers an entire 
section of their website towards advocacy tools for their members (APS 2013). 
Here, members can read on the activities of the lobbyists and see what bills and 
policies they are advocating for, write their member of congress, or volunteer to 
fly to Washington, D.C. to spend a day speaking with members of Congress and 
their staffers themselves. Because most physicists rely in federal science 
funding, many of their lobbying efforts include increasing funding levels or, more 
recently, keeping them consistent at the current levels.  
Scientists often face a series lack of time. Scientists have to find research 
grants, write grants, author articles, provide peer reviews, and then, if they have 
time, perform actual research. Studying policy propositions is often not high on 
their priority list. However, interest groups, especially trade and professional 
associations, have stepped up to fill that gap. By hiring lobbyists to focus on 
these issues full-time, trade and professional groups allow scientists to work and 
spend less time considering the political and ideological aspects of their work. 
Because of the importance of science in the world today, it is important to study 
science-related organizations separately from other interest groups. In this paper, 
I specifically examine how these organizations have formed over time. More 
interestingly, however, I examine how these groups in relation to federal science 
funding. Federal science funding provides one source of motivation for groups to 
form – in order to advocate for continuing and increased federal science funding.  
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Interest group theory  
Early interest group theorists, mainly subscribing to the pluralist schools, 
assumed that because humans are social creatures, people would band together 
and create groups to protect their shared interests. These groups, so goes the 
pluralist argument, then articulate their demands to the government, adding to 
political stability (Truman 1951). Early group theory rested on the pluralist 
assumption that the best political outcome would result from group conflict and 
compromise, with the government acting as mediator (Baumgartner and Leech 
1998). However, interest group research quickly evolved as scholars recognized 
that the pluralist assumptions of equal representation was untrue, with the 
wealthy and well-connected having far greater group representation in 
Washington (Schattschneider 1960). Interest groups, still, can act as a 
transmission belt for preferences between the general public and decision 
makers (Rasmussen et al. 2014). The interest group literature is broad and 
interesting, and includes contributions from not only political scientists, but also 
economists and sociologists. The literature review here focuses on the concepts 
of population ecology at work in this paper, but broad literatures reviewing a 
range of theories are readily available (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Mitchell 
and Munger 1991).  
Population ecology theories of interest groups 
The study of interest group populations has benefited greatly from 
population theories of biodiversity. Because we rely upon population ecology 
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theories here, we will say a little more about them. In biology, the diversity of 
populations is shaped by the environment. Babies are important only in the 
sense that they provide members for the population. The most important thing to 
shaping any population, whether it be wildflowers in Colorado or bears in East 
Tennessee, is the environment in which they enter, live, and survive. It matters 
how many bears are already living in the area and how much food is available to 
consume. It is the environment that shapes the bear population, not the bears 
themselves. 
In the interest group analogy, new groups add to the overall population, 
but the characteristics of said population are shaped by the environment. Thus, 
we can begin to think about interest group populations. New interest groups are 
only part of the story for interest group populations – the external environment in 
which the population is situated is important as well. Formation and mobilization 
of groups matter (if the bear population is already near its maximum possible, 
several dozen additional bears will change things), but are only part of the story 
(Lowery and Gray 1995). The environment into which a group enters affects not 
only the group, but the potential influence the group can have on politics (Gray 
and Lowery 2000; Gray and Lowery 2001). Outside rules and regulations seem 
to have little influence on the groups that enter the population when compared to 
the influence of the environment (Lowery and Gray 1997; Gray and Lowery 1998; 
Brasher et al. 1999). Regional effects are also found to have little influence (Gray 
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and Lowery 1998a). This theory has previously been used to study interest group 
populations in both an American and comparative context (Lowery et al. 2008b).  
Gray and Lowery used the general population ecology paradigm to explain 
overall numbers of groups in the states. Their theory asserts that interest group 
density is a function of potential constituents, potential government goods and 
services, stability of the political system, government age, and government size. 
Gray and Lowery use the energy, stability, area (ESA) theory of biodiversity to 
account for interest group populations. Interest group energy is defined as 
reflecting the resources available to lobbyists, including constituent interests and 
interest certainty (Lowery and Gray 1995). Stability is viewed via Olson’s 
hypothesis about the relationship between the interest group system age and the 
group density (Olson 1982). Finally, area is analogous to the number of potential 
constituents (Lowery and Gray 1995). Potential membership available to 
organizations is strongly related to the size of the interest community (Gray and 
Lowery 1997). Thus, the population ecology theory considers responses to 
environmental constraints very important to population formation (Lowery and 
Gray 1995).  
In our study, we focus on the energy component of this theory. I 
specifically examine the resource that is the federal science research budget. 
Each science-related interest group is interested in gaining additional resources 
(budgetary allotments for their specific field of research) for its members. Groups 
engage in many activities, including holding conferences and publishing journals, 
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but attaining research funds for members is important. Without funding, scholars 
have more trouble carrying out their research, which threatens the membership, 
and thus the existence of the group. Our motivation for examining a variety of 
science-related groups lies in the concept of population. In theory, a chemistry 
group has little reason for direct competition with physics groups.   
Groups, like species, compete for resources within an environment 
(MacIntosh 1992). Thus, species will tend to divide into differing niches to lessen 
their competition for resources (Colinvaux 1978). There is competition among 
interest groups for both potential members and the deliverance of goods to meet 
their demands (Lowery and Gray 1995; Haider-Markel 1997). Groups avoid 
competition by segregating into small issue niches (Gray and Lowery 1996a). 
Species relying on different resources have no reason to compete because 
access by one does not exclude others from the resources they need (Lowery 
and Gray 1995). A greater density of groups should lead to a sharper partitioning 
of niches. Interest group diversity is an artifact of the interests found in the 
community (Lowery and Gray 1998), although there is a limit to the diversity 
possible (Gray and Lowery 1996b). For example, the oldest science 
organizations are the most general organizations, such as the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science.  Since then, new interest groups 
have form with more and more specialized foci.   
For interest group populations, population density is a function of potential 
constituents, potential government goods and services, stability of the political 
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system, government age, and government size. In population ecology, as more 
species enter a system, previously existing species must either fight to survive, 
adapt to a changing environment, or exit the system. In reality, most 
organizations are characterized by strong inertial forces that limit how much they 
can change and adapt (Hart 1997). Adaption is possible, but difficult (Hannan 
and Freeman 1977). For example, Lowery and Gray (1993) found that state 
interest group density does not increase pari passu with economic size and 
complexity. At the state level, density in the smallest states appears partially to 
be an artifact of “natural” groups (such as those representing teachers, farmers, 
and bankers) that tend to exist in every state (Lowery and Gray 1993). In short, 
state economic growth and complexity need not trigger an explosion of groups 
(Lowery and Gray 1993; Wolak et al. 2002). The population ecology theory sets a 
limit on the overall number of groups, unlike earlier pluralist theories that assume 
there are an unlimited number of groups possible in an environment (Nownes 
2010). 
After taking various factors in to account that are unique for each 
distinguishable environment, the population that forms is optimized for that 
environment (Hannan and Freeman 1977). There is also an equilibrium number 
of groups for each unique environment. The carrying capacity for each 
environment is based on scarce resources needed for the groups to sustain 
themselves (Eldredge and Grene 1992). Interest groups are always seeking 
ways to survive (Lowery 2007).  
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Population ecology theories can also be used to examine the founding of 
organizations. When groups are first formed in an emerging issue area, few 
organizations will be formed because the groups and the issue itself must 
undergo legitimation to be viewed as important enough to be addressed. This 
legitimation process dominates at low group density. As an issue-area becomes 
legitimate, entrepreneurs can invest less effort in justification of their group and 
more time and resources on group organization. Thus, the number of groups will 
increase more rapidly. However, as the number of active groups increases, inter-
group competition increases and dominates at high density. This increased 
competition will decrease the number of organizational foundings (Nownes 
2004). The density dependence theory explains, for example, the growth of gay 
and lesbian rights groups.  The number of homosexual rights group foundings 
started small and rose only slightly at first, when legitimization concerns 
dominated.  Once the groups were considered legitimate, the number of 
foundings rose exponentially, peaked, and has declined slightly from inter-
organization competition (Nownes 2004). The exit rate, not the entrance rate, 
seems to be contingent on the size of the interest group population (Gray and 
Lowery 1995).  
These ecology-based models are more broadly consistent with the 
traditional pluralistic view of interest group politics than they are with public 
choice-derived theories, and they allow for a deeper understanding of group 
dynamics (Lowery and Gray 1995). Lowery and Gray describe a neopluralist 
68 
 
perspective where the collective action problem is not nearly as pervasive as 
Olson once suggested, although it exists at times (Lowery et al. 2005). 
Uncertainty over a policy or course of government action is a strong motivator for 
citizen participation in membership groups. While there is certainly an inequality 
of resources among interests, few groups are without any resources in pursuing 
influence. Research within the neopluralist perspective examines organized 
interests across all stages of the influence process, and holds that policy 
outcomes influence mobilization and the structure of interest populations and the 
types of activities employed in gaining influence (Lowery and Gray 2004; Gray et 
al. 2007).  
Theories related to the population ecology of interest group development 
will be used in this study because they allow us to focus on studying the 
relationship between interest groups and external stimuli.  Pluralist and elitist 
theory focuses on the relationships among people within a group, while 
exchange theory focuses on the relationship between a group entrepreneur and 
members.  Although aspects of economic theory of interest groups will be of 
interest in later studies, they move beyond actual group formation stimuli.  They 
tend to focus on the way interest groups affect society at large.  Here, we are just 
focused on how group formation is related to an external stimulus.  Here, the 
external stimulus is federal science funding. 
69 
 
Data and measurement 
In this paper, we rely upon The Encyclopedia of Associations for our data. 
It is important to note that this is not a perfect source. Because groups self-report 
to the Encyclopedia, groups may be excluded or choose not to identify. Some 
scholars have cross-checked this list with sources such as the New York Times 
Index (Nownes 2004). But the use of the Encyclopedia alone has precedent in 
the literature. Deborah Minkoff presented an event history analysis of national 
women’s and minority membership organizations with an emphasis on 
differences in organizational strategies, goals, and formal structure (Minkoff 
1993). She uses the Encyclopedia of Associations for organization listings with 
the acknowledgement that very small or short-lived associations are not 
adequately represented in the database (Minkoff 1993). She later uses the 
Encyclopedia of Associations to study women’s and minority rights groups 
transitioning from protest groups to more professionalized associations. 
Dependent variables 
To create our primary dependent variable, Number of nationally active 
science-related interest groups, we use the Encyclopedia of Associations. This 
variable is a yearly measure, which sums the number of groups in nine 
categories listed in the Encyclopedia: (1) chemical trade associations; (2) biology 
groups; (3) botany groups; (4) chemistry groups; (5) computer science groups; 
(6) energy groups; (7) geology groups; (8) physics groups; and (9) general 
science groups. These groups are predominately trade and professional 
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associations for scientists. The primary dependent variable of interest, then, is 
cross-sectional time-series that is simply a sum of all of the groups in a scientific 
issue area in a given year. The cross-section is scientific issue area. The time-
series is year. Therefore, the dataset is constructed as the number of groups in 
an area each year. It is then associated with various values for R&D funding as 
well as control variables. The data for this first dependent variable is collected 
from 1961 to 2009. The overall numbers of groups (across all disciplines) ranges 
from 157 (1961) to 419 (1996) groups. The scientific issue area with the largest 
number of active groups during this time period is energy, with a high of 70 
groups. 
I am also interested in the age of the group during any given year. The 
Encyclopedia of Associations lists the founding years of organizations, I confirm 
the volume’s accuracy by examining groups’ websites and other sources. Thus, 
we are able to determine the number of new groups that are formed each year. 
This gives the dependent variable of interest I the Foundings II section, Number 
of annual interest group foundings. The highest number of foundings occurred in 
1982 with 24 new groups joining the population. We again are working with a 
cross-section time-series analysis.   
Independent variables 
The main independent variable of interest is Total research and 
development funding from the federal government, which is the total overall 
federal research and development funding calculated in billions of 2009 U.S. 
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dollars. Data on government funding of scientific research and development 
comes from the National Science Foundation. The National Center for Science 
and Engineering Statistics (a division of the National Science Foundation) 
maintains statistics related to education, business and industry, research and 
development, the scientific workforce, and federal government involvement in 
science, particularly in funding and expenditures for science. The organization 
specifically maintains a database of current and historic federal funds for science 
and technology research (NSF 2012). Data is provided for overall federal funding 
data. I use the consumer price index provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics to convert all values to constant U.S. 2009 dollars. 
I also include three dichotomous independent variables to examine the 
effects of party control of specific government institutions. They are Party of the 
president, Party controlling the House, and Party controlling the Senate. Each of 
these variables is given a value of 1 for a year in which Democrats controlled the 
institution and a 0 otherwise. I include these three variables in my model to 
control for the effects of partisan politics in scientific funding decisions. I include 
simple party control rather than a variable like majority size because, in many 
ways, party control is more important than relative party size. In times of party 
polarization, parties are much more likely to vote as a block rather than breaking 
away from the party, leading to a simple majority/minority dichotomy rather than 
control based on the size of one’s majority. 
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For the second analysis, which examines the number of foundings as the 
dependent variable, I also include an independent variable that is Density, which 
is simply the number of groups that are already in the system the new group is 
entering. In order to complete a Poisson analysis, I also square the value for 
density and generate a Density2 variable. These two variables together allow us 
to test the foundings-related hypothesis. 
Methods 
 All of the data analyses performed in this paper are done in Stata. 
Because of the time-series aspect of this analysis, the author was careful to 
examine and account for the potential autocorrelation. Serial correlation could be 
present in both the dependent and independent variables. The number of groups 
one year is certainly based on the number the previous year. Federal R&D 
funding, while it changes annually, is certainly rooted in the amounts allocated 
the previous year. Correlograms suggested that lags were not significant in this 
study and Breush-Godfrey and Durbin-Watson tests also suggested a lack of 
serial correlation.  
In the second analysis, I used a Poisson distribution. This is typically used 
when the dependent variable is an asymmetric curve. It is often used when 
examining rates of incidence. Here, the incidence we are interested in is the rate 
of foundings of interest groups annually. We also use robust standard errors 
coupled with this Poisson analysis. 
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Findings I: Science-related interest group density and federal R&D 
Gray and Lowery use the theory of population ecology to predict the overall 
number of interest groups in the American states. Their theory asserts that 
interest group density is a function of potential constituents, potential government 
goods and services, stability of the political system, government age, and 
government size (Lowery and Gray 1995). Potential membership available to 
organizations is also strongly related to the size of the interest community (Gray 
and Lowery 1997). Based on their theories, I hypothesize that early growth of 
interest groups should correlate to increases in federal funding. This hypothesis 
is tentatively supported by the data presented in Figure 2, which plots the 
number of nationally active science-related interest groups over time (since 
1960). 
According the basic population ecology framework, the carrying capacity 
of the interest group system is a function of the overall federal science budget. 
Based on previous research, we formulated the following general hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: As the federal funding of research and development increases, the 
number of nationally active science-related interest groups increases. 
 
Testing this hypothesis is straightforward. We cast a time-series cross-section 
OLS regression model in which the dependent variable is Number of nationally 
active science-related interest groups, and the primary independent variable of 
interest is Total research and development funding from the federal government. 




Figure 2. The overall growth of science-related interest groups over time (a) as well as how the growth has correlated 
to overall science funding (corrected to constant 2009 dollars) over the same time period (b). 
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the model. The results of the cross-sectional, time-series Stata analysis is shown 
in Table 1. 
The data shown in Table 1 support Hypothesis #1, as the coefficient for Total 
R&D Funding is positive and statistically significant. In sum, the results show that 
as the overall federal science budget increases, the number of science-related 
groups increases as well. Specifically, the statistical results indicate that for each 
additional $1 billion in science funding, there will be 0.197 more groups in the 
population. Put another way, each additional $5.8 billion is associated with one 
additional group in the population. This holds true even when controlling for 
party. This idea coordinates with what we know theoretically. 
As more money is available for science, scientists will have more of an incentive 
to organize and advocate for funding, and more money is available for extant 
groups to thrive. Organizing also makes it easier to share information. By setting 
up conferences and meetings, organizations make it easier to set up 
collaborations and learn about the newest research. Federal funds make it 
possible for more scientists to attend these meetings, connecting federal funds to 
the growth of the organizational population. These results support Gray and 
Lowery’s (1995) ESA theory. Specifically, federal research funds provide a 
source of energy for science-related interest groups. The more energy--federal 
research funds--present in the environment, the more groups the environment 
can support.  
The findings on the effects of party control are also interesting. Previous
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work has shown that Democratic control of the House, Senate, and presidency 
leads to increases in federal science funding (Milojevich 2014). The coefficients 
in Table 1 suggest that Democratic control of the presidency, House, and Senate 
lead to fewer interest groups. One reason we may see this relationship comes 
from the political party-science funding relationship itself. If one reason these 
groups are forming is to lobby for additional science funding (a position espoused 
on several groups’ websites), if Democratic administration are already increasing 
science funding, groups may feel less of an impetus to form. During Democratic 
administrations, funding levels are likely increasing regardless, so fewer groups 
may be interested in forming and becoming active in the interest group 
population. 
Findings II: Interest group foundings  
We are also interested in the founding of new interest groups. We expect 
that the number of foundings will be relatively low initially, but increase as the 
population of groups in the issue area increases. Eventually, however, as per the 
density dependence hypothesis, when the population reaches a certain size the 
number of foundings will decrease. This leads to our second hypothesis, which is 
a variation of the general density dependence hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The number of science-related interest group foundings will be 
related in a curvilinear fashion to the overall number of nationally active science-




Figure 3. Total number of groups plotted with the number of founding of groups annually from 1961 to 2009. The 




A basic graphical test of this hypothesis is found in Figure 3, which plots 
both group density and group foundings. Figure 3 is suggestive. As per the 
general density dependence hypothesis, Figure 3 shows that the number of 
foundings is highest when density is increasing, and approaches zero as the 
overall number of groups levels off. This connects to theory—as interest groups 
in a specific area become more legitimized, new groups will form and existing 
groups will thrive.  
To quantitatively test Hypothesis #2, we examine the founding of science-
related interest groups in relation to both federal research funding and group 
density. Here, the dependent variable is the Foundings, which is the number of 
science-related interest groups foundings in a given year. As independent 
variables, we include Density, Density2, Total research and development funding 
from the federal government, and the party control variables. Because our 
dependent variable is a count variable, we utilized Poisson regression. The 
results of this analysis are shown in Table 2. 
The results support Hypothesis #2. Specifically, the positive coefficient on 
Density, and the small, negative coefficient on Density2 indicate that we do, 
indeed, observe a non-monotonic relationship as predicted. The value of the 
coefficient on Density is not only statistically significant, it is also much larger 
than the coefficient on the funding variable. Thus, we may conclude that as the  
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Table 7. Cross section, time series analysis of the number of interest group foundings annually in relation to federal 




number of overall groups in the population increases, the number of group 
foundings will also increase. The negative coefficient for the square of the density 
indicates that this independent variable will eventually decrease at some critical 
point. Prior work has also supported the idea that the formation of groups will 
increase while the overall population is increasing, but decline once a critical 
population is reached (Nownes 2004). The coefficient on our funding variable is 
statistically significant, leading us to believe that overall federal research funding 
does play a role in a group’s decision to form. 
Conclusion 
This paper examines the population of science-related interest groups 
over time and supports the ESA theory of interest group formation developed by 
Lowery and Gray (1995). This is the first study to specifically look at federal 
science funding and how it creates to the formation of interest groups, especially 
trade and professional organizations. Federal research funds provide the energy 
necessary to support an interest group population. As federal funding increases, 
more groups are founded. Specifically, another group will be founded for each 
additional $5.8 billion in federal research funds.  
 We also find that the number of group foundings follow a non-monotonic 
“inverted U” shape that is mostly dependent on the density of groups in the 
system. While federal funding does affect group formation, it is a small 
component compared to the effect of population density. More groups will form 
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as the density of groups increases, but will decline once a critical density, a 
carrying capacity, is reached. 
This study does not, however, examine the composition of each of these 
interest group populations. Future studies will examine not only the growth of 
these populations in relation to their external environment, but how these 
populations change over time. It has been suggested that as interest group 
populations grow and become more dense, groups will differentiate and seek 
different niches to fill. This characteristic will be examined in future work. We will 
also examine specific lobbying efforts of groups in these populations to examine 
how they change in relation to their external environment. 
As science takes a more and more prominent role in society and public 
policy question, it is vital that we look at the political activities of scientists. This 
study of the formation of science-related interest groups is the first that attempts 
to explain how scientists organize themselves and how this organization has 
grown over time. It is a vital first step to a more thorough explanation of how 
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Abstract  
A derivation from population ecology theories of interest is the theory of 
niche specialization. As the overall number of interest groups in a field increases, 
groups tend to become more specialized in order to decrease the amount of 
inter-group competition. While this theory has been discussed at length, has not 
yet been quantified over time. This study fills that gap. We find that for each ten 
additional groups added to a population, the population on average is likely to 
become nearly 5 percent more specialized. We also find that as federal research 
and development funding increases, groups become more specialized as well, 
likely because groups will be looking to distinguish themselves and their 
members’ research. This also supports population ecology and niche formation 
theory connecting competition to specialization.  
Published Work 
Public choice theorists have pointed to rent-seeking by interest groups as 
a driving force behind government spending (Leech, Baumgartner, Pira, & 
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Semanko, 2005). The federal government has steadily increased the amount of 
money it contributes to research and development since the 1950s. Thus, if 
public choice theorists are correct, one should observe an increase in the 
number of interest groups, specifically those related to science and scientific 
research, as federal science funding increases. Prior quantitative work has 
shown this to be true (Milojevich, 2012). Anecdotally, scientists have noted that 
the amount of lobbying activity by scientific organizations has increased, as have 
the number of grassroots appeals from groups to scientists (Drake, 2002).   
Extant research indicates that interest group populations are shaped by 
the environment in which they exist. Specifically, theory suggests that as more 
groups enter an interest group population, groups are likely to become more 
specialized, forming distinct niches in which to operate. Is this notion correct? 
This is the question we address here by examining science-related interest 
groups—trade and professional associations focused on chemicals, biology, 
chemistry, computer science, geology, physics, or general science. We also 
examine the effect of federal science research and development funding on 
niche-seeking. While this theory has been discussed qualitatively in the literature, 
this study is the first to illustrate this concept quantitatively on an interest group 
population. 
Science in the United States 
Since the Manhattan Project, the federal government has steadily 




Figure 4. Overall U.S. funding for research and development and federal R&D funding as a percent of the overall 




fact, federal funds pay for approximately one-third of all research and 
development (R&D) in the United States. Figure 1 illustrates this increase. 
 At the same time, more and more policy decisions involve science and 
scientific research, ranging from national security to public health. Individual 
scientists may not realize that work is so necessary and relevant, but 
organizations have noted this importance for years. More and more science-
related interest groups have emerged since the 1960s, and many hire full-time, 
in-house lobbyists. Indeed, the American Physical Society (the professional 
association for physicists in the United States) offers an entire section of their 
website towards advocacy tools for their members (APS, 2013). Here, members 
can read on the activities of the lobbyists and see what bills and policies they are 
advocating for, write their member of congress, or volunteer to fly to Washington, 
D.C. to spend a day speaking with members of Congress and their staffers 
themselves. Because most physicists rely in federal science funding, many of 
their lobbying efforts include increasing funding levels or, more recently, keeping 
them consistent at the current levels.  
Scientists often face a series lack of time. Scientists have to find research 
grants, write grants, author articles, provide peer reviews, and then, if they have 
time, perform actual research. Studying policy propositions is often not high on 
their priority list. However, interest groups, especially trade and professional 
associations, have stepped up to fill that gap. By hiring lobbyists to focus on 
these issues full-time, trade and professional groups allow scientists to work and 
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spend less time considering the political and ideological aspects of their work. 
Because of the importance of science in the world today, it is important to study 
science-related organizations separately from other interest groups. In this paper, 
I will specifically examine the specialization of this population of groups over 
time. 
Interest group theory 
Pluralists assumed that because humans are social creatures, people 
would band together and create groups to protect their shared interests. These 
shared-interest groups, so goes the pluralist argument, then articulate their 
demands to the government, adding to political stability (Truman, 1951). Early 
group theory rested on the pluralist assumption that the best political outcome 
would result from group conflict and compromise, with the government acting as 
mediator (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998). These ideas have informed more recent 
interest group theory, specifically, population ecology approaches to explaining 
group formation and survival.  
Population ecology theories of interest groups 
The study of interest group populations has benefited greatly from 
population theories of biodiversity. Because we rely upon population ecology 
theories here, we will say a little more about them. In biology, the diversity of 
populations is shaped by the environment. New individuals are continually added 
to the overall population, but the characteristics of the population at large are 
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shaped by the environment, not necessarily by the new babies in the population 
themselves. In interest group theory, new interest groups forming are only part of 
the story for the overall populations – the external environment shapes the 
population as well. Formation and mobilization of groups can only partially 
explain the nature and size of overall populations (Lowery & Gray, 1995). 
Competition within an environment is also important to this theory.   
For interest group populations, population density is a function of potential 
constituents, potential government goods and services, stability of the political 
system, government age, and government size. Gray and Lowery use the 
energy, stability, area (ESA) theory of biodiversity to account for the size of 
interest group populations. In biological populations, energy is needed to sustain 
individuals and species. Greater energy leads to more species that can be 
supported in that environment (Wilson, 1992). Interest group energy reflects the 
resources available to lobbyists, including constituent interests and interest 
certainty (Lowery & Gray, 1995). Biological stability is the absence of fluctuations 
in the environment that can stress organisms (Pimm, Jones, & Diamond, 1988). 
Stability in interest group populations is viewed via Olson’s hypothesis about the 
relationship between interest group system age and group density (Olson, 1982). 
Finally, area is analogous to the number of potential constituents in the 
environment (Lowery & Gray, 1995). The relationship between area and the 
density of a population is positive and curvilinear (Wilson, 1992). Potential 
membership available to organizations is positively related to the size of the 
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interest community (Gray & Lowery, 1997). In this initial study of the diversity of 
the science-related interest group population, we focus on the energy aspect of 
this theory by characterizing interest group energy as the amount of federal 
research and development funding available 
Interest group populations are also shaped by the formation or emergence 
of new groups. As more groups enter a system, previously existing groups must 
either fight to survive, adapt to a changing environment, or exit the system. In 
reality, most organizations are characterized by strong inertial forces that limit 
how much they can change and adapt (Hart, 1997). For example, Lowery and 
Gray (1993) found that state interest group density does not increase pari passu 
with economic size and complexity. State economic growth and complexity need 
not trigger an explosion of groups (Lowery & Gray, 1993). The population 
ecology theory sets a limit on the overall number of groups, unlike earlier pluralist 
theories that assume there are an unlimited number of groups possible in an 
environment. 
Groups, like species, compete for resources within an environment 
(MacIntosh, 1992). Thus, species will tend to divide into differing niches to lessen 
competition for resources (Colinvaux, 1978). There is competition among interest 
groups for both potential members and the delivery of goods to meet their 
demands (Lowery & Gray, 1995). Groups avoid competition by segregating into 
small issue niches (Gray & Lowery, 1996). Species relying on different resources 
have no reason to compete because access by one does not exclude others 
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from the resources they need (Lowery & Gray, 1995). A greater density of groups 
should lead to a sharper partitioning of niches.  
Ecology-based models are more broadly consistent with the traditional 
pluralistic view of interest group politics than they are with public choice-derived 
theories, and they allow for a deeper understanding of group dynamics (Lowery 
& Gray, 1995). Lowery and Gray describe a neopluralist perspective in which the 
collective action problem is not nearly as pervasive as Olson suggested. 
Uncertainty over a policy or course of government action is a strong motivator for 
citizen participation in membership groups. While there is certainly an inequality 
of resources among interests, few groups are without any resources in pursuing 
their political goals. Research within the neopluralist perspective examines 
organized interests across all stages of the influence process, and holds that 
policy outcomes influence mobilization and the structure of interest populations 
and the types of activities employed in gaining influence (Lowery & Gray, 2004). 
In our study, resources are broadly defined as the federal science 
research budget. Each science-related interest group is interested in gaining 
additional resources for its members. Interest groups engage in many activities, 
including holding conferences and publishing journals, but attaining research 
funds for members remains very important. Without funding, scholars have more 
trouble carrying out their research, threatening group membership and, thus, the 
existence of the group. Our motivation for examining a variety of science-related 
groups lies in the concept of population.  
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In what follows, we draw upon population ecology models to posit a 
relationship between the behavior of science-related interest groups and their 
external environment, specifically focusing on federal science funding. Pluralist 
and elitist theories focus on the relationships among people within a group, while 
exchange theory focuses on the relationship between a group leader and group 
supporters. Although aspects of economic theories of interest groups may be 
useful for other purposes, they do not tell us much about group formation.  
Data and measurement 
In this paper, we are specifically concerned with the overall specialization 
of science-related interest group populations annually, the annual federal R&D 
budget, and the size of the existing population. 
Dependent variable 
We rely upon The Encyclopedia of Associations to build a list of interest 
groups active during the period 1978-2009. It is important to note that this is not a 
perfect source. But its use has precedent in the literature. Deborah Minkoff, for 
example, relied upon The Encyclopedia in her analysis of national women’s and 
minority membership organizations (Minkoff, 1993). Minkoff acknowledges the 
weaknesses of The Encyclopedia, but maintains that it remains a good source for 
information about groups over time.   
Here, we rely upon The Encyclopedia to build a population list of science-
related interest groups. To create our primary dependent variable, Group 
specialization, we first create a list of interest groups for each year from 1978 to 
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2009. This group is subdivided by category by each of the following types of 
groups (as defined by the Encyclopedia of Associations): (1) chemical trade 
associations; (2) biology groups; (3) chemistry groups; (4) computer science 
groups; (5) geology groups; (6) physics groups; and (7) general science groups. 
These categories create the panel aspect of our cross-section time-series 
dataset.  
Each group is assigned a score from one to three based on how 
specialized it is. We coded the dependent variable ourselves, based on 
information in The Encyclopedia. A more general group will be assigned a “1” 
while more specialized niche groups will be given a “3” score. Specifically, each 
score is based on: 
1 – the group name and/or mission statement only mentions the science area in 
which it is based (chemistry, biology, etc.) 
2 – the group name and/or mission statement mentions a subset of a scientific 
area, but nothing more specific (analytical chemistry, microbiology, reactor 
phsyics, etc.) 
3 – the group name and/or mission statement is a specialized niche beyond a 
subsection of a scientific area 
Thus, each group, every year, will be given a score of 1, 2, or 3 based on how 
general or specialized the group’s focus is. This is based on both the title of the 
group as provided in the Encyclopedia of Associations as well as the description 
of the group. The Encyclopedia of Associations asks each group listed to not only 
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provide a group name, but also basic statistics and a description of their mission 
statement and activities. For the author, using self-provided descriptions is 
preferable to potential outsider subjective measures because gives a sense of 
how these groups self-identify. This is how the group views themselves as part of 
the interest group population. 
An example will also help illustrate how we coded each groups. For each 
year in the study, we assigned each chemistry group a ranking of 3 (which 
indicates a very generic group such as The American Chemical Society that does 
not mention any chemistry specialization), 2 (which indicates a more specialized 
group such as The Association of Analytical Chemists, which focuses on one of 
the five main areas of chemistry but does not specify any further), or 1 (which 
indicates an obviously very specialized group such as The American Leather 
Chemists Association). We acknowledge that there is some level of subjectivity in 
this measure; however, the rubric aims to minimize the subjective nature of this 
measurement. The groups were also coded using the same rubric by a scientific 
expert (an individual with a chemistry Ph.D.) with a resulting 0.96 intercoder 
reliability. 
Once every group is coded for every year, we can create the dependent 
variable Group specialization. This variable is actually the average of all the 
groups in each of the seven scientific issue areas described above. Thus, we 
have a description for how general/specialized the entire population of, say, 
chemistry-related interest groups is for that year. The variable changes each year 
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based on the interest group population that year. Thus, our dependent variable is 
a continuous variable from 1 to 3 based on how specialized the entire population 
is that year. 
Independent variables 
Our first independent variable of interest is Total number of interest 
groups, which is a yearly measure of the size of the overall science-related 
interest groups each year. This is a count variable that is set up as a cross-
section time-series data that lists the overall number of groups in a population by 
scientific issue area annually. Our basic hypothesis is that the higher the group 
density, the more likely specialized groups are to emerge. Population ecology 
theory is also based on competition. There is competition among interest groups 
for both potential members and goods that can be delivered (Lowery & Gray, 
1995).  Groups avoid competition by segregating into small niches (Gray & 
Lowery, 1996). Species relying on different resources have no reasons to 
compete because access by one does not exclude others from the resources 
they need (Lowery & Gray, 1995).  A greater density of groups should lead to a 
sharper partitioning of niches.  
Our second independent variable of interest is Total research and 
development (R&D) funding. Data on government funding of scientific research 
and development comes from the National Science Foundation. The National 
Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (a division of the National Science 
Foundation) maintains statistics related to education, business and industry, 
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research and development, the scientific workforce, and federal government 
involvement in science, particularly for funding and expenditures for science. The 
organization specifically maintains a database of current and historic federal 
funds for science and technology research (NSF, 2012). This variable is a yearly 
measure of the total amount of research and development funding provided by 
the federal government. All values were converted to constant 2009 dollars using 
the Consumer Price Index. 
Methods 
All data analysis was performed in Stata by first declaring the dataset to 
be both a panel dataset (by area of scientific inquiry as described above) and 
time series (1978-2009) for a total of 224 observations. Thus, the data was set 
up as an average specialization of the population each year in each category. 
Cross-section time-series ordinary least squares regression was used to obtain 
coefficients. Analysis on the errors indicated that lags were not largely significant 
in this analysis, although they were considered.  
Niche formation findings 
In short, we are primarily interested in examining the relationship between 
interest group population density, and interest group specialization. We are also 
interested in examining the relationship between federal government funding of 
science and interest group specialization. Here, we test two broad hypotheses: 
Hypothesis One:  As interest group density increases, the interest group 




Hypothesis Two:  As federal government science funding increases, interest 
groups will become more specialized. 
 
 To test these hypotheses, we cast a time series cross-section regression 
model in which Group specialization (range = 1-3) is the dependent variable, and 
Overall number of interest groups, and Total federal research and development 
funding are our two independent variables.  
The results of our analysis are found in Table 8. The results indicate that the 
overall interest group population, indeed, becomes more specialized as more 
groups join the population. New groups joining the population are more likely to 
be specialized niche groups than not. Based on the coefficients, for every one 
group that joins a population, the group population will become 0.479 percent 
more specialized. Thus, an additional ten groups leads to a nearly 5 percent 
increase in the overall group specialization score. We see a similar result for total 
R&D funding. For each additional $1 billion in federal science funding, the 
interest group population becomes 0.43 percent more specialized. The constant, 
1.7, indicates that group populations are initially moderately specific at the start 
of the study, 1978, and as groups form and join the population, the population 
becomes more specific over time, filling more niches. The overall population 
becomes more specialized as the number of groups increases and federal 
funding for science research increases. The possibility also exists that this 
specialization also occurs from the death of generalization groups, but this 
seems unlikely. Many general science groups, such as the American Chemical 
Society (founded in 1876) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
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Table 8. Cross-section, time series regression results with the overall niche score as the dependent variable and the 




(IEEE, founded in 1884) have long histories and large memberships. An 
investigation of the dataset indicates the death of no such interest group.  
Discussion 
These results support the niche-seeking interpretation of interest groups offered 
by population ecology theory. Our findings indicate that as more groups enter a 
population, the overall group population becomes more specialized. New groups 
forming and joining the population are more likely to be specialized to fill a niche. 
When new groups form and join a population, they are likely to be a specialized 
group looking to represent more specialized subfields in order to both to avoid 
competition with larger, more general groups, as well as to recruit additional 
members. Thus, the overall population becomes more specialized from these 
new specialized groups 
A more specialized focus may also give groups a unique way to recruit 
members. Many scientists are already members of well-established general 
groups. The American Chemical Society, an organization representing chemists 
formed in 1876, has a membership of over 160,000 and almost 2,000 employees 
(ACS, 2013). While chemists may be hesitant to join a group that is newly formed 
that addresses similar issues as the ACS, they may be more likely to join 
specialized groups that do not directly compete with the ACS. In short, there are 
good reasons for groups in crowded populations to specialize.  
By becoming more specialized and moving into a niche, groups are able 
to avoid competing with other groups. The Society of Cosmetic Chemists faces 
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little direct competition for members from the International Society for Fluoride 
Research, even though both largely draw from chemists as their members. If a 
scientist performs fluoride-related research, they are likely to be the only 
researcher at their university or company participating in that research. Thus, 
joining of such a society provides an opportunity to attend conferences and find 
collaboration partners in their narrow field of research without them having to 
divert large amounts of their time to this endeavor. Similarly, the group is able to 
keep their members informed of relevant policies without the members 
themselves having to devote their time to reading the Federal Register or other 
such publications. 
Groups are also able to differentiate themselves in ways other than their 
research interests. In 2009, for example, the following chemistry groups were 
operational – the North American Chinese Clinical Chemists Association, the 
Iranian Chemists’ Association, and the National Organization for the Professional 
Advancement of Black Chemists and Chemical Engineers. Groups such as these 
allow members to connect with people they might may not meet otherwise—for 
example, scientists with different specialties may be able to meet scientists with 
whom they share race or ethnicity. This creates a sense of community where it 
may be lacking within an individual sub discipline.   
Our findings also show that in addition to the number of groups driving 
specialization, increased federal research and development funding also drives 
specialization. As the federal government funds additional scientific research, 
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science-related interest group populations become more specialized. In this 
study, federal funding is analogous to “energy” in Gray and Lowery’s ESA theory 
(Lowery & Gray, 1995). More federal science funds mean increased energy, 
which leads to more groups. From here, more groups lead to a more specialized 
population.  
Using the above example, members of the Society of Cosmetic Chemists 
are not necessarily competing for research funds against members of the 
International Society for Fluoride Research. They each are applying for money 
from different research pools. However, the research funding pool must exist if 
their members are going to receive anything. Thus, an increase in federal funds 
overall can result in group specialization by the desire for funds aimed towards 
the group’s target audience.  
Increasing federal funds also provides energy to interest group 
populations by giving the groups a target for their members. Additional science 
funds provide incentives for groups to become more specialized by trying to 
advocate additional or earmarked funds for their members. Thus, specialization 
becomes an important factor to think about when considering science-related 
interest group populations. 
Conclusion 
We find in this paper that science-related interest groups have become 
more specialized over time, as both federal funding for science and group density 
have increased. The population becomes nearly 5 percent more specialized for 
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every 10 additional groups that enter it and nearly 4 percent more specialized for 
each additional $10 billion in federal research and development funding. 
Ultimately, our data demonstrate specialization and niche formation within an 
interest group population over time. Thus, they provide support for the population 
ecology perspective, which is increasingly used to explain group population 
trajectories, as well as individual group behavior. This concept has been 
discussed at great length in the literature, but this is the first study to the author’s 
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Abstract  
Science and technology play an increasingly important role in policy 
debates, from energy independence to national security. Because of its growing 
importance, it is necessary to examine science and research funding and how it 
changes over time. Since the Lobbying Disclosure Act, organizations and 
individuals have been forced to disclose the amount of money they spend 
lobbying Congress. In this paper, I am specifically interested in the lobbying 
expenditures of science-related interest groups and federal scientific research 
and development funding. Examining lobbying expenditures of trade and 
professional associations related to chemistry, biology, geology, and physics 
from 1998 to 2012 and federal research and development funding, I find there is 
no statistically significant relationship between the two. This lack of statistical 
significance holds even when parsed out among basic and applied research and 
among various scientific disciplines. So what does affect levels of funding? The 
answer is control of political institutions. When Democrats control the House and 
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the Senate, scientific funding tends to increase, which correlates to results 
presented earlier. 
Published Work 
There has generally been a divide between scholars and journalists as to 
the role of interest groups and, in particular, lobbying in American politics. The 
narratives offered on Fox News and MSNBC suggest that evil lobbyists shape 
every event and every piece of legislation that comes to committee, let alone full 
chamber vote in Congress. The common wisdom espoused by journalists is that 
interest group lobbying can have a substantial influence on how legislators vote 
(Edsall 1988; Birnbaum 1992; Birnbaum and Murray 1987). Scholars are 
dubious. While there is evidence suggesting that lobbying and associated 
activities such as PAC giving are important, there are also studies suggesting 
that there is little correlation between lobbying and PAC donations and legislative 
outcomes. Here, I am interested in a topic that has received scant attention in the 
political science literature – federal funding of scientific research and 
development.  
This lack of attention to science funding is surprising given the vital role 
that science plays in a wide range of issue areas. Science and technology play a 
role in energy security and independence, environmental preservation, 
education, national security, medical advancements, and transportation. All of 
these are areas that affect and are affected by politics and political decisions. 
Funding for research and development and how it changes is, thus, an important 
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area to study and understand. This study is the first of its kind to examine the 
relationship between lobbying by science-related interest groups and the growth 
of federal scientific research and development funding. Previous work has 
examined the growth of science-related interest groups and the growth of federal 
scientific research and development (R&D) funding. This research showed that 
for each additional $5.8 billion in overall federal R&D funding, another group will 
join the interest group population. Here, I examine the lobbying activities of 
science-related groups, which are predominantly trade and professional 
associations. I find that the lobbying expenditures of these groups has no 
statistically significant relationship to increases or changes in federal science 
funding. Even after parsing out funding by scientific area (chemistry verses 
biology verses geology verses physics) and lobbying performed by their 
associated interest groups, there is no correlation between lobbying expenditures 
and federal science funding.  
Lobbyists: What are they, what do they do, and is it effective? 
An interest group is any group or organization that makes demands upon 
government. The more appropriate term is “organized interest,” because many of 
the groups making demands on the government are not what we traditionally 
identify as “interest groups.” This definition includes universities. Interest groups 
engage in a wide variety of activities, such as direct lobbying, asking citizen 
members to contact their legislators, publishing research reports, and making 
presentations to Congress. The tactics that an interest group uses depend upon 
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its perception of how legislators may help them achieve their goals, their policy 
positions, and their resources (Hojnacki and Kimball 1999). The legislative 
branch is the most common target of lobbying, and is the focus of this analysis. 
Theories of lobbying 
The exchange theory of lobbying views interest groups as rational 
opportunists that aim to seek rents for their own gain. Exchange models assume 
that legislators and lobbyists make mutually beneficial trades, including campaign 
contributions and information (Morton and Cameron 1992). As lobbyists and 
legislators get to know one another, mutual confidence, trust, and understanding 
grow (Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Exchange theories would portray science 
group lobbyists as agents who provide members of Congress with information on 
how research funds would better their universities and how this support would 
benefit members’ districts. This would also lead us to expect that the longer a 
university lobbyist lobbies Congress, the more relationships are cultivated and 
the more money would be allocated to that university. Lobbyists, in effect, are 
agents of exchange (Austen-Smith 1996)  
A second theory involves the idea of lobbying as persuasion rather than 
exchange.  Information lies at the heart of this theory. The information that 
lobbyists provide, according to this theory, is not innocuous. Interest groups have 
a comparative advantage in gathering information that may be useful to 
legislators seeking reelection. Lobbyists can use this information to persuade 
uncertain legislators that their reelection chances will increase if they take a 
117 
 
position that is friendly to the group (Hansen 1991). Lobbyists are thus able to 
persuade legislators to adjust their positions on the basis of the lobbying 
information (Wright 1996). Here, a lobbying for an organization like 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change may spend a portion of their time 
talking to Members of Congress (or, more likely, their staff) trying to use 
information on climate change to try to persuade climate change deniers to 
change their position or, more likely, persuade the members with little or no 
opinion to support climate change legislation. 
A third theory involves lobbying as a legislative subsidy. In this theory, 
lobbyists match policy information, political intelligence, and labor to strategically 
selected legislators. Lobbyists assist their allies by “arming” them with “weapons” 
designed to help them advocate and vote for legislation that is advantageous to 
the lobbyist and his/her group (Hall and Deardorff 2006). This theory assumes 
the following: (1) a legislator must work at it if he/she expects to have any 
influence on policy; (2) legislators’ resources are scarce; (3) legislators have 
more than one policy concern at a time (though they care about some issues 
more than others); and (4) relative to legislators, lobbyists are specialists (Hall 
and Deardorff 2006). Thus, lobbyists are able to provide costly information, such 
as in-depth policy analyses and reports (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; 
Whiteman 1995), as well as political intelligence (Whiteman 1995; Wright 1996). 
Legislators structure the Congressional environment to channel relevant interest 
group influence and facilitate group access. Legislators affect their interactions 
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with lobbyists by establishing lobbying enterprises, making known their 
information shortcomings. These lobbying enterprises allow lobbyists to 
coordinate their efforts with sympathetic legislators by coordinating legislators to 
advocate on behalf of their issue (Ainsworth 1997). This could prove to an 
important role for the lobbyist for a science-related interest group. There are an 
abysmally small number of legislators with a science background (even if 
physicians are counted among the scientists), yet they make decisions on a 
regular basis that invovle science and technology. A lobbying could provide 
information that informs a decision, whether it be a floor vote, writing a piece of 
legislation, or co-sponsoring a bill. A lobbyist for the American Nuclear Society, 
for example, could provide information on public opinion, economic impacts, and 
job projections for a new nuclear power plant in a member’s district. 
Lobbying activities and congressional influence 
The “common” wisdom among journalists is that lobbying can have a 
substantial influence on how members of Congress vote (Birnbaum and Murray 
1987; Edsall 1988; Birnbaum 1992). Academics are far more skeptical. The 
traditional scholarly wisdom is that lobbying groups have little success in 
persuading or pressuring members of Congress. Any influence they do exert 
comes from reinforcing the decisions and actions of legislators. Lobbyists may 
also have some success at persuading undecided or weakly committed members 
to their position (Smith 1995). One of the reasons lobbying may not have large 
persuasion effects is that changing a person’s attitude, especially in the short 
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run, is difficult. By and large, attempting to change a person’s attitude is a long 
term proposition, which is why much lobbying occurs with those who already 
agree with the lobbyist (Bauer et al. 1972). 
Not all scholars agree that lobbying is ineffective. Smith (1993) suggests 
that while legislators’ preferences are stable in the short term, they are not 
necessarily attached to specific pieces of legislation. Thus, lobbyists are able to 
shape and influence a member’s perception of a piece of legislation that fits with 
the group’s perception and opinion (Smith 1993). Groups help legislators 
interpret policies and proposals. This influence is certainly substantial, even if it 
can change over time (Smith 1984, 1993).  
While much remains unknown about the impact of lobbyists, scholars 
have identified some circumstances under which lobbyists are most likely to be 
influential. Studies suggest that a lobbyist will have more influence when 
legislators believe his/her expertise exceeds their own (Rothenberg 1992). 
Lobbyists can also have more influence on issues of low salience to the general 
public (which federal research funding certainly is) (Rothenberg 1992).  
In perhaps the largest study of lobbyist ever, The Hollow Core: Private 
Interests in National Policy Making, Robert Salisbury and his colleagues question 
how influential groups actually are in Washington.  One of their conclusions is 
that uncertainty is the key to understanding lobbyists.  There is always 
uncertainty about the path government will take, due to many things including the 
expanded significance of federal policies and the expansion of staffs.  Groups 
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now have multiple access points within Congress, but there is also more 
competition for attention.  Thus, the explosion of groups in Washington is a result 
of more groups trying to minimize their uncertainty and have their say.  However, 
groups do not know how much impact their work has (Heinz et al. 1993).  The 
authors found that unlike previously prevalent iron triangle arguments, where an 
interest group, legislator, and agency actor form a subgovernment controlling an 
issue area (Hayden 2002), there is no cohesive private elite consistently 
occupying a central, mediating position in the networks among representatives 
(Heinz et al. 1993). 
By far the most influential book on lobbying of the 21st century is Lobbying 
and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why.  The authors explain why 
lobbyists are far less successful than popular rhetoric would suggest 
(Baumgartner et al. 2009). Of the 98 issue areas studied, 17 percent had only 
one side on the issue and 60 percent of issue areas had only two sides.  Overall, 
60 percent of the issue areas had no change from the status quo, 13 percent had 
modest change, and 27 percent of the cases experienced significant change.  
The authors conclude that the status quo is very difficult to change.  Thus, once a 
university starts receiving appropriations, it is likely to continue to receive federal 
appropriations, making lobbyists’ continued efforts exercises in maintaining the 
status quo.  
Some of these notions are likely to be at play here with research funding.  
Traditionally, members of Congress are not experts in science and engineering 
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and, thus, are in a poor position to help make these types of decisions. Thus, 
they must rely on information from lobbyists which, in our study, are 
representatives of research universities. While executive agencies play a role in 
research funding allocation, Congress is able to allocate vast amounts of money 
to universities themselves. Lobbying by universities provides a much needed 
source of information from a reputable organization. 
Science-related interest group lobbying and federal funding 
 The literature on lobbying has produced mixed results on the effectiveness 
of lobbying on specific policy change. Previous chapters in this dissertation have 
shown that political control of key institutions (the House, the Senate, and the 
Presidency) is an important determinant in federal research and development 
funding. Democratic control tends to lead increased levels of federal R&D 
funding. Another previous chapter provided evidence that increased federal R&D 
funding is correlated with an increase in science-related interest groups. Thus, 
this chapter attempts to discovery the relationship between lobbying by these 
interest groups and federal R&D funding. The theory would provide that 
increased efforts of lobbyists from science-related interests groups, providing 
information on the importance of scientific funding, would lead to increased 
federal science funding regardless of party control of political institutions. Thus, 
all of the hypotheses, presented later in the paper, relate the increase of lobbying 




Data and methods  
The unit of analysis here is lobbying expenditures by science-related 
interest groups. The primary source for information on the interest group 
population (that is, what groups exist in the realm we are interested in), is the 
Encyclopedia of Associations. It is important to note that this is not a perfect 
source, but its use has precedent in the literature (Minkoff, 1993). We rely upon 
the Encyclopedia to build to population list of relevant science-related interest 
groups and cross check the list with groups that are identifying as science-related 
on www.opensecrets.org and in their disclosure forms filed in accordance with 
the Lobbying Disclosure Act.  
 Data on research and development funding comes from the National 
Science Foundation’s 2012 Science and Engineering Indicators (NSF 2012). The 
National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (a division of the National 
Science Foundation) maintains a database of current and historic federal funds 
for science and technology research.  
Dependent variables 
 The dependent variables are variations of federal scientific research and 
development funding. Federal R&D funding is parsed out in a variety of ways to 
determine if different types of federal R&D funding relate differently to lobbying 
efforts by interest groups. The initial analysis looks at federal spending on 
research and development across disciplines. For the initial analysis, we use the 
dependent variable Overall R&D. This is used in millions of 2013 U.S. dollars. I 
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then break down this variable into two of its components--basic research funding, 
and applied research funding, creating two additional dependent variables--Basic 
R&D and Applied R&D. I did not include funding earmarked for development. I 
made this decision because much of this money is granted to private companies 
that are looking to develop research produced at the basic and applied level into 
market appropriate technologies.  
 I classify funding by scientific discipline to see whether any general trends 
observed with the overall funding across disciplines could be carried through 
when disciplines were examined individually. Were chemists more effective 
lobbyists than biologists? I analyzed four disciplines as to both their basic and 
applied research and development funding. This allowed me to create eight 
additional dependent variables– Chemistry basic R&D, Chemistry applied R&D, 
Biology basic R&D, Biology applied R&D, Geology basic R&D, Geology applied 
R&D, Physics basic R&D, Physics applied R&D. Taken together, these 
dependent variables allow me to examine both macro funding by the government 
and more specific funding. For all of these variables, I use the time period 1998-
2013. All values are also corrected using the Consumer Price Index to constant 
2012 U.S. dollars.  
Independent variables 
The key independent variable of interests is Lobbying Expenditures. I am 
specifically examining the lobbying expenditures of science-related interest 
groups. I predominantly use trade and professional associations that are listed in 
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the Encyclopedia of Associations and gather data on their lobbying expenditures 
from the website www.opensecrets.org, which collects and distributes data from 
the Senate Office of Public Records (Center for Responsive Politics 2014). I 
cross check this data with information from databases available from the House 
and Senate websites about the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (Office of Public 
Records 2014; Office of the Clerk 2014). Unfortunately, this variable limits the 
time period of this study because the law only required lobbying expenditure 
reporting from 1998 onward. This variable is set up as cross-section time-series 
data. Each group has values based on the thousands of dollars they spent 
lobbying from 1998 to 2013. Thus, the group is the cross-sectional aspect and 
the years are the time. 
In my models, I include controls for partisanship. I show previously in this 
dissertation that the political party controlling the House and the Senate affects 
overall federal funding. I code my partisanship variable as a dummy; if the 
Democrats hold more seats, it is coded as a “1,” and if the Republicans hold 
more seats, it is coded as a “0.”  I also create two additional independent 
variables– House and Senate. These dichotomous variables allow me to make 
connections to previous work indicating the importance of political institution 
control for funding changes.  
Methods 
 All of the analyses in this chapter were performed in Stata with panel time 
series datasets. When dealing with cross-section time-series data, it is possible 
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to use either a random effects or a fixed effects model. A fixed effects model 
explores the relationship between a predictor and outcome variable within an 
entity. It also assumes that something within the individual may impact or bias 
the predictor or outcome variable. Fixed effects remove the effect of time-
invariant characteristics so the net effects can be analyzed. In a random effects 
model, the variation across categories (here, individual interest groups) is 
assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the predictor or the independent 
variables within the model. Here, differences between categories have some 
influence on the dependent variable. To determine which error is appropriate to 
use, a Hausman test is performed, which determines if the unique errors are 
correlated with the regressors. Estimates are stored for both a fixed effects 
model and a random effects model and stored in Stata. A subsequent Hausman 
test revealed an insignificant χ2 (chi-squared) value, leading to the conclusion 
that a random effects estimator is appropriate. A Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier test indicates that a standard OLS regression is inappropriate, 
necessitating the need for random and time series effects. In the end, I chose to 
use a random effects model for these analyses, leading to the conclusions in the 
upcoming discussion. 
Results and discussion 
In this section, I present a series of analyses that probe the relationship 
between the lobbying expenditures of science-related interest groups and federal 
research and development spending. The first set of analyses examines the 
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relationship between total lobbying expenditures of all groups for the period 
1998-2013 and overall federal R&D funding, basic R&D funding, and applied 
R&D funding. While this is a relatively short time period (due to lobbying 
expenditure reporting requirements), the large number of groups in the 
population results in a large-N. The next set of analyses examines the 
relationship between lobbying expenditures and funding in different areas.   
Total lobbying and federal research and development funding 
The first analysis looks at the connection between overall, basic, and 
applied research and development funding and lobbying expenditures. I test the 
following three general hypotheses, labeled as Models 1, 2, and 3: 
Hypothesis 1: As lobbying expenditures increase, overall federal R&D funding 
increases. 
 
Hypothesis 2: As lobbying expenditures increase, basic federal R&D funding 
increases. 
 
Hypothesis 3: As lobbying expenditures increase, applied federal R&D funding 
increases. 
 
In the statistical models, I control for the party controlling the House and Senate. 
The results of this general analysis are shown in Table 1. The independent 
variable of interest is Lobbying expenditures. The results in Table 1 support none 
of my hypotheses. In no model is the coefficient on Lobbying expenditures 
statistically significant (though the coefficient is in the expected direction in the 
first model). The coefficients on my party control variables are significant in all 
three models. The results indicate that ceteris paribus, if Democrats control the 
Senate, overall science R&D funding increases more than 4.5 percent (a nearly 
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Table 9. Changes in federal R&D funding from 1998-2011. The values for R&D funding are given in thousands of 





$5.6 million increase from the constant of nearly $121 million). The effect is even 
greater when Democrats control the House. In short, Democratic control of 
Congress is strongly related to all forms of science funding. 
Chemistry Lobbying and R&D funding 
 Because the previous analyses did not support any of my hypotheses, I 
took a closer and more nuanced look are the relationship between lobbying and 
science funding. Instead of looking at the lobbying efforts of all science-related 
interest groups, I broke the groups in to categories based on issue area. While a 
multitude of issue areas were represented, I focused on groups in four areas – 
chemistry, biology, physics, and geology. These are also four areas of science 
with significant federal R&D funding.  
 In the following analyses, the general dependent variable (federal 
research and development funding) is broken into four subcategories. 
Specifically, I examine how much the government spends on basic chemistry 
R&D, and applied chemistry R&D.  
Hypothesis 4: As chemistry-related lobbying expenditures increase, basic 
chemistry-related federal R&D funding increases. 
 
Hypothesis 5: As chemistry-related lobbying expenditures increase, applied 
chemistry-related federal R&D funding increases. 
 
Table 2 contains the results of two new analyses. Listed next to each new 
chemistry-specific analysis is the corresponding general analysis from Table 1.  
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Once again, the coefficients on the independent variable of interest—
Lobbying expenditures—are not significant. In short, there is no evidence here 
that more lobbying by chemistry-related groups leads to more funding chemistry-
related R&D. In fact, the direction of the coefficient in both chemistry-specific 
models suggests that additional lobbying efforts may actually decrease the level 
of chemistry-related funding (though again, the coefficient is not significant). 
Again, the coefficients on the party control variables indicate that party control of 
Congress profoundly affects levels of science (in this case chemistry-specific 
science) funding. 
Biology Lobbying and R&D Funding 
 Next, using the same approach I use in the previous section, I examine 
the impact of biology-specific science funding.  
Hypothesis 6: As biology-related lobbying expenditures increase, basic biology-
related federal R&D funding increases. 
 
Hypothesis 7: As biology-related lobbying expenditures increase, applied biology-
related federal R&D funding increases. 
 
The results of these analyses are found in Table 11. 
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Once again, the results fail to illustrate a lobbying effect. Again, in neither new 
model is the coefficient on Lobbying expenditures statistically significant. And 
once again, the effects of party control seem profound.   
Geology Lobbying and R&D Funding 
 I also took a closer look at Geology-specific science funding.  
Hypothesis 8: As geology-related lobbying expenditures increase, basic geology-
related federal R&D funding increases. 
 
Hypothesis 9: As geology-related lobbying expenditures increase, applied 
geology-related federal R&D funding increases. 
 
Once again, the results were nil. The coefficient on Lobbying expenditures in the 
two new models is not statistically significant. Again, party control seems to 
matter a great deal.  
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These results do not support our theory, but are consistent with previously 
reported results. 
Physics Lobbying and R&D funding 
 Finally, I took a closer look at physics-specific lobbying.  
Hypothesis 10: As physics-related lobbying expenditures increase, basic physics-
related federal R&D funding increases. 
 
Hypothesis11: As physics-related lobbying expenditures increase, applied 
physics-related federal R&D funding increases. 
 
The pattern here is the same – the new models provide no support for the notion 
that lobbying affects government support, and a great deal of support for the 
notion that party control of the legislature matters a lot. 
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In this paper I examine the relationship between the lobbying expenditures 
of science-related interest groups and federal research and development 
expenditures. Included in this analysis were membership groups, trade 
associations, and professional associations. In sum, in none of my models did I 
find a statistically significant relationship between the independent variable of 
interest and government spending on science. In my general models as well as 
my specific models, lobbying expenditures just did not seem to matter.  The 
statistical models were, however, informative. The political control variables I 
included in each model (dummies for each chamber) produced significant results 
in almost all cases. In short, the data show very clearly that the level of federal 
science funding is profoundly affected by which party controls Congress. 
Specifically, Democrats are much better for funding science than Republicans 
are. 
 Previous studies on the relationship between lobbying and legislative 
outcomes are mixed. My findings are not mixed at all—all of my data points to 
the conclusion that lobbying does not matter much. The findings do emphasize, 
however, the importance of political control of Congress for policy outcomes. The 
implication of this finding for interest groups is clear—they may get more “bang 
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As more and more of our public policy decisions involve science and 
technology, the political activities of scientists becomes more important. This 
dissertation is a baseline study for the activities of these activities. Interest 
groups are studied less frequently in the political science literature, providing a 
critical need for this study. This dissertation is an attempt to bring the political 
activities of science and scientists in to the realm of traditional political science 
research.  
The first chapter concluded that, largely, federal R&D funding increases 
under Democratic control of key political institutions. This is, perhaps, an 
intuitional conclusion. The Democratic Party has long been associated with 
liberal policy stances towards topics like the environment, clean/green energy, 
and welfare. This leads one to logically conclude that the Democratic Party would 
be more likely to support enterprises like scientific research and technology, 
activities which do not have immediate market applicability. This is could be 
especially true in basic research, which attempts to address and answer 
fundamental questions about life, the universe, and everything. While much basic 
research has eventually led to market innovations (cell phones would not be 
possible without basic research on transistors and advanced materials), this is 
not immediate and not guaranteed. In support of this line of logic, I quantify the 
change and show that, largely, federal R&D funding increases when Democrats 
control the House, Senate, and presidency. This holds when examining overall 
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R&D funding, basic research funding, and applied research funding. I also find 
that conservative, liberal, and neutral agencies tend to allocate higher R&D funds 
when Democrats control these three political institutions. This is especially 
interesting to me because I would expect to see lower levels of funding, or at 
least smaller increases in funding, to, say, the Department of Defense when 
Democrats are at the helm. The DoD is infamous for its support from the 
Republic Party, so the fact that even their R&D funding increases under 
Democratic administrations is especially interesting. It is also interesting that the 
control variables have the direction expected – science funding increased during 
the Cold War and decreased during economic recessions. America was 
especially interested in building their military and increasing their capability to 
make war during the Cold War, and investment in science and technology is key 
to military advances. It is also logical for funding to decrease during economic 
recessions because resources will be diverted elsewhere. 
Future iterations of this paper will certainly include a more distinct 
examination of how science funding changed and was affected by the terrorist 
attacks of September 11. I think this could be especially interesting because I 
suspect one would find a sharper partition between basic and applied research 
than I find at the high level examined in my dissertation. Especially with the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security, I think that I would find that the 
government invested large amount of money towards groups investigating 
applications of previous research, especially in the area of trace detectors for 
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nuclear and chemical agents. There will also be large investments towards 
deployment of technology as compared to basic scientific inquiry. I think this 
would also be an interesting way to study how the allocation of funds changed. I 
suspect that nuclear engineering departments saw a large upswing in their 
funding after 9/11 that has either leveled off or decreased over the last several 
years. I would perhaps also include a qualitative examination of, for example, 
one specific agency over time. For example, we could examine how Department 
of Defense funding has changed over the years. I suspect we would find large 
investments in basic research through the 1960s and 1970s that moved towards 
a focus on applied research over the decades.  
Additionally, I would be interested in studying the role of large, 
international collaborative efforts on science funding and science output. The 
idea of “big science,” where large organizations spend large amounts of money 
to build huge, massive, and expensive scientific equipment designed to be used 
by large numbers of users. The Large Hadron Collider built at CERN (the 
European Organization for Nuclear Research) in Switzerland is the largest 
particle accelerator in the world and is used by hundreds or thousands of users 
annually for a wide range of scientific research. The increase in these types of 
resources has fundamentally change the way that science, especially 
fundamental science, is done worldwide. It would be an interesting study to try 
and determine if these large scientific enterprises are taking funds away from 
smaller groups that don’t focus on fundamental questions requiring things like 
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particle accelerators, or if the additional funding for “big science” projects is in 
addition to and on top of more traditional research. 
The second chapter of this dissertation focuses on the way that science-
related interest groups have grown since the 1960s. The major contribution to the 
literature is the idea that the science-related interest group population has not 
only grown over the previous five decades naturally, the increase in federal R&D 
funds has contributed to that growth. An additional $5.8 billion in research 
funding contributes to an additional group joining the population. This is a novel 
take on the “energy” aspect of the ESA theory developed by Virginia Gray and 
David Lowery.  
This chapter also provides commentary on the founding of new science-
related groups in an interest group population. This follows work done by Gray 
and Lowery and Nownes that shows that the number of foundings annually 
follows a Poisson distribution, rises quickly, then decreases once a maximum 
carrying capacity is reached. This chapter specifically contributes to this literature 
by linking the number of foundings annually to federal R&D funding. I find that 
increased federal R&D funding leads to an increase in group foundings for a 
given year. However, this effect dissipates eventually when the number of new 
founds again decreases. 
Future iterations of this paper would focus on interest group growth in one 
specific area. I think an area ripe for study would be to examine the growth of 
defense related groups conducting research and development. It is likely that, 
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like other interest group populations, defense interest groups have grown in 
number and specificity have grown over the decades. We could specifically 
examine the growth of these defense related groups in relation to R&D outlays by 
the Department of Defense.  
Future studies would also benefit from inclusion of groups from the New 
York Times index to make sure that the list garnered from the Encyclopedia of 
Associations is correct and complete. While the Encyclopedia certainly includes 
many groups, it is likely that several are missing. Those most likely to be missing 
are those that are mobilizing to counter an extremely salient policy issue and is 
relatively short lived. 
The work connecting R&D funding to new interest groups entering the 
population naturally leads to my third chapter, which looks at how the overall 
interest group population becomes more specialized over time and in relation to 
federal R&D funding. The major contribution to the literature that Chapter III 
provides is quantitative evidence that interest group populations get more 
specialized both over time and with the increase in federal R&D funds. Interest 
groups studies are said to be theory heavy and data poor. Thus, this study 
attempts to quantify this long theorized idea. Science-related interest group 
populations become more specialized over time and with increased funding. This 
supports the theory because as the size of a population increases, groups tend 
to specialize (making the population more specialized overall) to segregate in to 
niches and avoid competition. Additional R&D funds also cause groups to 
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become more specialized because the more specialized because groups that are 
segregated in to niches are less likely to compete with one another for federal 
R&D funds. 
Another interesting addition to this paper in future iterations will be to 
include a section on how groups changed in response to 9/11. After the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, Congress created large amounts of new budget money to spend 
towards defense and anti-terrorist activities, including R&D activities (especially 
in detection and crisis response). In response to this, I suspect a large number of 
new groups formed. I also suspect that groups were more specialized than the 
population that was already in place. A highly specialized group would be more 
likely to mobilize their members to lobby Members of Congress and the 
bureaucracy for R&D funding. They could use their specialization as a way to 
illustrate the high priority for research in their issue area. An especially interesting 
area for study would be the specialization of defense-related groups who perform 
government-support research and development and the increase in R&D funding 
from the Department of Defense. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the lobbying efforts of the groups studies in 
Chapters II and III. Much to my surprise, lobbying by these groups produced no 
statistically significant results on changes to the federal R&D budget. This is in 
keeping with some of the literature and in opposition to the rest. I do happen to 
think there is some relationship between lobbying and federal R&D funding, but I 
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think that I will have to focus and/or refine the dataset to tease out the 
relationship. 
An obvious first step to moving forward is focusing on lobbying efforts for a 
specific law. It is not unreasonable to believe that the effect of lobbying is lost 
when looking at such a broad policy decision like R&D funding. But looking at a 
specific law, such as a House resolution for new money devoted to R&D in a 
specific research area, might allow more clarity as to the effect of lobbying. A 
very specific law that would influence, say, analytical chemists would bring out 
more lobbying efforts than large, expansive budgetary exercises in Congress 
with no specific allocations in mind. 
It could also be interesting to study specific areas of federal R&D funding 
more completely and thoroughly. For example, climate change research has 
been expanding over the previous three decades. The number of groups 
advocating for climate change, from a variety of perspectives, has also grown 
over the previous three decades. The connections between the lobbying and 
advocacy of these groups and attention to the climate change issue are an 
important relationship and one that has not previously been studied in the 
political science literature. Once a relationship between lobbying/activism and 
political attention and salience is established, the connection to climate-related 
R&D funding can be ascertained. I think that, at least in the case of climate 
change, the connection will be easier to find. Climate change did not naturally 
come to be important to lawmakers and decision makers; it had to be brought to 
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their attention by interested individuals and groups. These same groups also had 
to teach decision makers about the importance of scientific research to study the 
causes and potential solutions to climate change problems and to make sure 
funds were allocated.  
Another area of study, though one that would require a complete research 
redesign, is to study the R&D tax credit. The Research and Experimentation Tax 
Credit is a general business tax credit for businesses that are incurring R&D 
expenses within the United States. While this isn’t strictly government output or 
outlays for scientific research, taxes that are withheld can certainly be viewed as 
support of R&D. This is an especially interesting take on federal R&D spending 
because many of the activities are taken by large, private firms. Since the R&D 
tax credit’s original expiration date of December 31, 1985, it has been extended 
fourteen times. While the extension would seem to be certain, individuals (either 
lobbyists or staffers or even Members of Congress themselves) still have to take 
it upon themselves to bring up the tax credit for renewal and extension. It would 
be interesting to find a connection between lobbying efforts of firms that take the 
R&D tax credit and lobbying efforts of similar large businesses not conducting 
R&D. This could be a difficult project to tease out results from because large 
firms that also perform R&D, such as Johnson and Johnson and Apple, lobby on 
a wide range of issues, not just issues relates to the R&D tax credit. However, 
this important tax credit has not been studied in the realm of political science and 
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especially lobbying and interest groups, so this is an important and potentially 
ripe area of study. 
Overall, there are many ways that the political activities of scientists and 
science-related groups can be brought in to the realm of traditional political 
science literature. There have been several articles and books published on the 
activities of lobbyists. However, there has been no work done on how lobbyists 
are perceived by Congressional staffers. Several years ago, I spent the summer 
in Washington D.C. and during that time, I spent time interviewing Congressional 
staffers about how they receive information from lobbyists and their relationship 
with them. As it happens, at the end of the summer I had completed 20 
interviews that lasted thirty to forty-five minutes each. I interviewed five 
Republican House staff members, five Democratic House staff members, five 
Republican Senate staff members, and five Democratic Senate staff members by 
the end of the summer.  
The broad conclusion that I garnered from all of these interviews is that 
their relationship with lobbyists is similar to what we have learned from interviews 
with lobbyists. This is interesting because it confirms previous political science 
work in the realm of interest groups and lobbyists. Almost all of the staffers 
confirmed that they meet with lobbyists from groups that both support and 
oppose the policy stances of their Member of Congress. However, they tend to 
meet more regularly with lobbyists who are on the same “side” of a policy issue. 
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They also tend to believe and rely on information provided by lobbyists who fall 
on the same side of a policy issue. 
For example, one staffer (the lead legislative assistant for environmental 
and energy issues) from an extremely liberal House member’s office commented 
that every year, a lobbyist from the coal industry meets with her and discusses 
why they believe the Member of Congress should support pro-coal legislation. 
She comments that they are always polite to one another, even though they both 
know they are not going to change each other’s minds. She accepts his “glossy 
pamphlets” and files them away. When asked why she thought he meets with her 
annually, she commented that she thought it was because he just wanted to stay 
on her radar, make sure she knows there is someone from the coal industry that 
she can call when she needs, and, perhaps most importantly, to check off to his 
boss that he met with a large number of staffers (regardless of their 
receptiveness to the policy issue). This was especially interesting me because 
her comments complement what scholars have heard from lobbyists about why 
they meet with Congressional staffers who do not necessarily agree with their 
policy stance. 
Continuing this set of interviews and writing the conclusions will be an 
interesting and, I think, impactful contribution to the literature. We have some 
idea of how lobbyists spend their days. This study asks the question – is this time 
spent well? Or are lobbyists’ activities wasted efforts? I think that there is a 
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mutual understanding between staffers and lobbyists about the role each other 
plays and furthering this study could address this question. 
It would also be interesting to study the day-to-day activities of science-
related organizations. Scholars have spent time following lobbyists for days or 
weeks at a time to determine what they do during their daily activities. It would be 
interesting to see if lobbyists for science-related groups spend their time pursuing 
the same activities as their counterparts for non-science groups. I suspect that 
the lobbyists for organizations such as the American Chemical Society spend a 
significant amount of time working with scientists and studying the issues from a 
technical perspective. 
I think it will also be important to interview scientists themselves (not 
lobbyists for science-related groups) to determine how much they know about the 
political activities of groups of which they are members. We could also use this 
opportunity to ask them about their individual activism and whether they think it 
matters. I suspect that we will find that many scientists spend little to no time 
thinking about the lobbying efforts of groups they participate. However, I think the 
same scientists who do not participate in activities like emailing their Members of 
Congress would also admit that politics and Congress have an effect on their 
work because of how much science is federally funded. This relationship 
between a vested interested in the federal government due to funding issues and 
lack of participation is an interesting application of Mancur Olson’s collective 
action problem. I do think, however, that we could meet during these interviews 
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scientists who recognize the importance of politics in science and spend at least 
some effort following policy debates in Washington and emailing their Members 
of Congress, even if it is at the urging of trade and professional associations in 
which they are members. 
Science is playing and will continue to play a more important role in 
national policy debates, from defense to the environment. Thus, the political 
activities of scientists are a rich area for study to increase our understanding, 
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